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THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’?:
#METOO AND OUR MOVEMENT FORWARD*
Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani**

ABSTRACT
Social movements like #MeToo have gained public traction like never before. In
this Article, we place those developments within their historical context and chart a path
forward. First, we provide a history of the prior unsuccessful attempts to ratify an Equal
Rights Amendment, and we discuss that effort’s current legal status and prospects.
Then, we briefly review the history of sexual harassment law. Having outlined this
historical context, we move to contemporary developments. We describe actions that
state legislatures and local municipalities have taken to address the concerns raised by
the #MeToo movement. Finally, we discuss how inflection points can lead to change and
we make concrete reform suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
On the first anniversary of their report on Harvey Weinstein
sexually abusing women, New York Times reporters Jodi Kantor and
Megan Twohey reflected: “All of us have been told that the key to gender
equality is looking to the future. . . . The past year has shown that this
wisdom is incomplete. To move forward, we have to excavate the past.”1
The #MeToo movement, started by activist Tarana Burke over a decade
ago 2 and brought to headlines by the New York Times report, seems to
have rocked our nation to its core—or at least grabbed its attention. By
upending the careers of high-profile, abusive men, the movement has
placed a spotlight on wrongs rampant in our society. 3 #MeToo
crusaders utilize social media, press coverage, and their celebrity status
to provide a voice to previously silenced survivors 4 across nearly every
1. Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, News Analysis: A Year of Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/sunday-review/me-too-weinstein-a-year-later.html
[https://perma.cc/7XZS-ACVS]. For the original report, see Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey
Weinstein Paid off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/
2XP9-9TGU].
2. Tarana Burke created Just Be Inc., an “organization that helps victims of sexual
harassment and assault,” and she called her movement “Me Too.” Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman
Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html [https://perma.cc/KE4S-4PTU]. After the
New York Times report on October 5, 2017, actress Alyssa Milano used the hashtag #metoo to
encourage others to share their experiences being sexually harassed or assaulted. Id. This helped
set off the viral #MeToo movement. Id. Milano later publicly credited Burke for her work. Id.
3. Audrey Carlsen, Maya Salam, Claire Cain Miller, Denise Lu, Ash Ngu, Jugal K. Patel &
Zach Wichter, #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are
Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metooreplacements.html [https://perma.cc/7FKS-PLFZ].
4. This Article uses the word “survivor” rather than “victim,” while also recognizing that some
may prefer the term “victim.” See generally The Language We Use, WOMEN AGAINST ABUSE, https://
www.womenagainstabuse.org/education-resources/the-language-we-use [https://perma.cc/EDD95QPW]; Key Terms and Phrases, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/key-terms-and-phrases [https://
perma.cc/D4AD-HNHB]; Kate Harding, I’ve Been Told I’m a Survivor, Not a Victim. But What’s Wrong With
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industry. 5 Feminist legal scholar and Michigan Law Professor Catharine
MacKinnon believes that the #MeToo movement exposed “the disbelief
and trivializing dehumanization of [sexual harassment] victims.” 6 We
cannot end sexual harassment without changing the norms of ignoring
harassing behavior and minimizing the experiences of those who have
survived sexual misconduct. 7
The issue of pervasive sexual harassment has been the focus of
legal, academic, and feminist scholars and activists for decades. For
example, when Yale Law Professor Vicki Schultz first
“reconceptualized” sexual harassment in 1998, she wrote that her work
“ha[d] been a long time in the making.” 8 And in 2003, Yale Law
Professor Reva Siegel remarked that discussions of sexual harassment
have “continue[d] without sign of diminishing, in the workplace and
the popular press, as well as in . . . academic fora.” 9 This Article traces
the history of that discussion through the stalled constitutional
amendment to provide equal rights for women (the Equal Rights
Amendment or ERA). In addition, it follows the decades-long
movement to identify, define, sanction, and prevent sexual harassment
in the workplace, as well as the courts’ role in these developments. The
legal doctrine that reflects this story is the foundation upon which the
#MeToo movement took force. 10 As Professor MacKinnon notes,
“[s]exual harassment law—the first to conceive sexual violation in
inequality terms—created the preconditions for this moment.” 11 In light
of the #MeToo movement, it is time to evaluate the failures and
successes of sexual harassment laws. By accounting for this history, we
will see how far we have come, how much further we have yet to go, and
what impact (if any) the #MeToo movement has had on American
corporate culture.
In the wake of #MeToo, journalists have devoted significant efforts
to investigating the influence of this movement on society’s perception
of sexual harassment. Jodi Kantor and Megan Twohey documented the
cultural shift brought about by the Harvey Weinstein investigations. 12
Although some states engaged in legislative reform, Kantor and Twohey
Being a Victim?, TIME (Feb. 27, 2020, 8:20 AM), https://time.com/5789032/victim-survivor-sexualassault/ [https://perma.cc/G9C2-HZSM].
5. See Carlsen et al., supra note 3.
6. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Opinion, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not,N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html [https://perma.cc/
5QAA-9QA7].
7. See id.
8. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1683 n.0 (1998).
9. Reva B. Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT
LAW 1 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2003).
10. See MacKinnon, supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
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do not believe the law (as a whole) reflects society’s “shifts in social
attitudes.” 13 Perceptions of sexual harassment vary “widely along
partisan lines,” 14 and these political views challenge the durability and
significance of shifting social attitudes. In 1991, Anita Hill testified
before the Senate Judiciary Committee that then-Supreme Court
nominee Clarence Thomas sexually harassed her. 15 She was subjected to
an invasive inquisition and faced so much public opposition that she
resigned from a tenured position at the University of Oklahoma. 16 By
contrast, in November 2017, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
stood in defense of four women who came forward against thenSenatorial candidate Roy Moore with allegations of sexual
misconduct. 17 McConnell was the highest-profile Republican at the time
to demand that Moore step down from the race. 18 It appeared that
change was on the horizon. Yet only one year later, then-Supreme
Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh was confirmed despite testimony from
Dr. Christine Blasey Ford that Kavanaugh sexually assaulted her. 19 Are
we back where we started?
Achieving sustainable reform in societal gender values may require
further changes in sexual discrimination law because of the
“intersubjective . . . and symbolic qualities of modern law.” 20 This
Article’s discussion of these issues proceeds in four parts. Part I
provides background on the so-far unsuccessful attempts to amend the
United States Constitution to grant equal rights to women. Part II
follows with a brief history of sexual harassment law. Part III continues
by discussing efforts by state legislatures and local municipalities to
shed light on sexual discrimination by prohibiting nondisclosure
agreements in settlements of claims for workplace sexual misconduct,
among other laws. And in Part IV, the Article discusses historical

13. Id.
14. See Nikki Graf, Sexual Harassment at Work in the Era of #MeToo, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 4,
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2018/04/04/sexual-harassment-at-work-inthe-era-of-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/WLT2-Y6MN].
15. Julia Jacobs, Anita Hill’s Testimony and Other Key Moments from the Clarence Thomas Hearings, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/us/politics/anita-hill-testimonyclarence-thomas.html [https://perma.cc/2X4F-RKRX].
16. Chris Casteel, ‘Speaking Truth to Power’, Anita Hill Tells Why She Left OU, OKLAHOMAN (Sept.
28, 1997), https://www.oklahoman.com/article/4804079/speaking-truth-to-power-anita-hill-tellswhy-she-left-ou [https://perma.cc/52GY-UPRM].
17. David A. Graham, ‘I Believe the Women, Yes’, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/i-believe-the-women-yes/545750/ [https://perma.cc/8EZCBHP4].
18. Id.
19. Martin Pengelly, Christine Blasey Ford Makes Rare Public Remarks, a Year After Kavanaugh
Ordeal, GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/18/christineblasey-ford-brett-kavanaugh [https://perma.cc/SP4N-QKUC].
20. See Kathryn L. Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination
Law, WIS. L. REV. 55, 63 (1979).
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inflection points prompting societal change, finding that 2020–2021
may have been one of those points.
I. THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
The Equal Rights Amendment is a proposed Constitutional
amendment to uphold equal rights under the law regardless of sex. 21
The first attempt to incorporate an Equal Rights Amendment into the
United States Constitution followed naturally from the enactment of
the Nineteenth Amendment. This effort was spearheaded by the
National Women’s Party, which formed in June 1916 with the goal of
securing a woman’s right to vote. 22 After the Nineteenth Amendment
became law on August 18, 1920, the National Women’s Party shifted its
focus to the broader goal of women’s equality. 23 With its support, the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was first introduced as a Congressional
bill in December 1923. 24 The bill was unsuccessful in part because
women were divided along socioeconomic lines. 25 Some opponents of
the ERA, primarily working women, feared losing labor protections
unique to women. 26 Other opponents of the ERA feared losing the
special status of women that allowed for the right of wives to be
protected by their husbands and for the “traditional American family.” 27
With the rise of the women’s rights movement in the 1960s, there
was enough Congressional support in the 1970s to pass the ERA: it was
approved by the House in 1971 and the Senate followed suit in 1972. 28
Representative Martha W. Griffiths and Senator Birch Bayh were the
ERA’s lead proponents in the House and Senate respectively. 29 For the
ERA to become law, the proposed amendment next needed approval
from the legislatures of at least three-quarters of the states, or thirty-

21. Tara Law, Virginia Just Became the 38th State to Pass the Equal Rights Amendment. Here’s What
to Know About the History of the ERA, TIME (Jan. 15, 2020, 4:51 PM), https://time.com/5657997/equalrights-amendment-history/ [https://perma.cc/56MV-ED3H].
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Three Amendments Offered in Senate, BALT. SUN, Dec. 11, 1923, at 2.
25. See Rebecca DeWolf, Amending Nature: The Equal Rights Amendment and Gendered
Citizenship in America, 1920–1963 (2014) (Ph.D dissertation, American University) (ProQuest).
26. American Women: Topical Essays, The Long Road to Equality: What Women Won from the ERA
Ratification Effort, LIBR. CONG., https://guides.loc.gov/american-women-essays/era-ratificationeffort [https://perma.cc/URU6-3Y3Z].
27. Law, supra note 21; see also Chats with Visitors, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1922, at 32 (citing
similar concerns by Matthew Woll, Vice President of the American Federation of Labor at the
time).
28. Law, supra note 21.
29. Eileen Shanahan, Equal Rights Amendment Is Approved by Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1972, at 1.
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eight states. 30 Supporters were initially optimistic that this threshold
would be met: although the ERA had a seven-year ratification deadline
(1979), Senator Bayh believed it would take only two years to obtain
sufficient state ratification. 31 Such optimism would prove unwarranted.
Despite the deadline’s extension to 1982, only thirty-five states ratified
the ERA in time 32—five of which subsequently attempted to revoke their
ratification. 33 Three additional states recently voted in favor of the
ERA—Nevada (2017), Illinois (2018), and Virginia (2020). 34 Although
thirty-eight states have now ratified the ERA, the expired deadline and
five revocations make the legal effect of these recent state ratifications
unclear.
Congress could likely act to change the ERA’s ratification deadline
even now: unlike the Eighteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-First, and TwentySecond Amendments, the ERA’s text does not include an express
ratification deadline. 35 And in Coleman v. Miller, the Supreme Court held
that Congress, not the courts, had the final authority on whether a
ratification deadline could be extended. 36 Coleman also held that the
validity of a state revocation is a nonjusticiable political question.37
Thus, the legal effect of revocation is theoretically up to Congress unless
Coleman is overruled. 38 But as Professor Gerard Magliocca has pointed
out, Congress would be adopting an inconsistent position if it
simultaneously extended an expired deadline by four decades and
maintained that States’ previous decisions are irrevocable. 39 It is
ultimately unlikely, therefore, that the three recent ratifications are
sufficient to turn the ERA into law. The #MeToo movement’s revival of
interest in the ERA, though likely without legal consequence, may
symbolize the increased value placed on women in American society
and give further power to female voices.

30. U.S. CONST. art. V.
31. Shanahan, supra note 29.
32. Law, supra note 21.
33. These states were Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, Tennessee, and South Dakota. Peter
Michael Jung, Note, Validity of a State’s Rescission of Its Ratification of a Federal Constitutional
Amendment, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 233 n.2 (1979). Idaho, Nebraska, and Tennessee
ultimately rescinded ratification. Id.
34. Law, supra note 21.
35. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Buried Alive: The Reboot of the Equal Rights Amendment, 71 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 633, 642–50 (2019).
36. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (1939); Magliocca, supra note 35, at 647.
37. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450.
38. See Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Herndon & Danielle M. Stager, The Equal Rights Amendment:
Why the ERA Remains Legal, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113, 130–34 (1997).
39. Magliocca, supra note 35, at 654.
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A. Judicial Action vs. Amendment
Legal academics dispute whether the judiciary or an amendment
would better address the issue of women’s equality. 40 A 1971 Yale Law
Journal article, written by Yale Professor Thomas Emerson and three
students, addressed this question, finding that the ERA would better
address the issue. 41 The Emerson article was praised by Representative
Griffiths and Senator Bayh and “referred to with approval in the
Congressional Reports.” 42 The article weighed judicial versus legislative
options for improving women’s rights, ultimately favoring the ERA
because it would provide absolute equality, while the judiciary would
rely on discriminatory precedent. 43
Emerson believed that no meaningful change to women’s rights
could occur absent an uncompromising amendment. 44 Several
proposed revisions which would have limited the ERA’s scope
ultimately failed, including amendments with exceptions for
“physiological or functional differences” 45 or for the draft, 46 and an
amendment that would have the ERA’s anti-discrimination provision
parallel the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 Emerson argued that absolute
language 48 was necessary because: 1) many women do not fit the female
stereotype assumed by law, 2) sex discrimination is interrelated across
contexts (e.g., the benefits of equal access to public education are
limited if there is discrimination in public employment), and 3) one
group will dominate in a dual system of rights and responsibilities (as
with race). 49 Considering the ERA’s broad scope but limited
Congressional analysis, opponents worried about the potential
unintended consequences resulting from an absolute amendment. 50
Harvard Law Professor Paul Freund compared the choice between the
ERA and alternative legislative or judicial solutions to a
40. See Susan Chira, Do American Women Still Need an Equal Rights Amendment?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
16,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/16/sunday-review/women-equal-rightsamendment.html [https://perma.cc/NGF2-YFE5].
41. Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
42. Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533, 1536 (1973).
43. Brown et al., supra note 41, at 872–74, 879–81.
44. See id. at 888–89.
45. Equal Rights Amendment May Be a Mixed Blessing, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER, June 6, 1972, at 8.
46. Shanahan, supra note 29.
47. Paul A. Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 234,
237–38 (1971) (“[E]qual protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of
sex.”).
48. Section 1 of the ERA provides: “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” Proposed Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, H.R.J. Res. 208., 92nd Cong. (1972).
49. Brown et al., supra note 41, at 873–74.
50. See, e.g., Freund, supra note 47, at 234–35.
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“choice . . . between a single broad-spectrum drug with uncertain and
unwanted side-effects and a selection of specific pills for specific ills.” 51
Opponents of the ERA were also concerned that a broad amendment
would generate litigation, 52 and any unanticipated judicial results
would be more difficult to rectify for an amendment than for a statute. 53
Emerson also doubted that Equal Protection jurisprudence would
expand to protect against classifications based on sex. 54 Early Supreme
Court cases indicated that sex-based classifications were permissible
because women had a “separate place” in society. 55 In 1872, Bradwell v.
Illinois upheld an exclusion of women from the legal profession. 56 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Bradley expressed that “[t]he natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.” 57 In 1908, the Court
agreed in Muller v. Oregon that a woman “is properly placed in a class by
herself” in upholding a state law setting a maximum number of hours
that women could work. 58 Due to differences in physical strength and a
fear of exploitation by men, 59 the Court was willing to depart from the
general freedom from work hour limitations (based on the freedom of
contract) which it had decided in Lochner v. New York in 1905.60 Later
cases reinforced the notion of women’s separate place in society. In
1961, Hoyt v. Florida upheld a Florida statute giving women the option to
opt into the jury pool as a reasonable classification because the “woman
is still regarded as the center of home and family life.” 61 And in 1971, the
Court affirmed the district court’s judgment on a challenge against the
single sex status of two South Carolina state universities. 62 The district
court entered judgment for the defendants on the grounds that this sex

51. Id. at 235.
52. Henry J. Hyde, Equal Rights Amendment: The Losses Can Outweigh the Gains, CHI. TRIBUNE,
June 9, 1972, at 16.
53. Andrew Schepard, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1520 (1971).
54. See Brown, et al., supra note 41, at 875–83.
55. Id. at 876.
56. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872).
57. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
58. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908).
59. Id. at 421–23.
60. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), and
abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
61. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961). Opponents of the ERA also argued that it was
reasonable for this Florida statute to presume, based on prior history, that most women would
request excusal from jury service because of household duties. Freund, supra note 47, at 236.
62. Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S. 951, 951 (1971). The specific universities in question were the
Citadel (only men) and Winthrop College (only women). Brown et al., supra note 41, 881. The
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment without hearing argument and without
opinion. Williams, 401 U.S. at 951.
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classification had a rational justification under the Equal Protection
Clause. 63
More conceptually, both sides of the ERA debate contested the
similarities and differences between sex- and race-based
classifications. 64 Proponents of the ERA pointed to the similarities,
arguing that sexbased classifications, like race-based classifications,
should be subject to strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection
Clause. 65 Classifications based on both race and sex create large groups
that are beyond an individual’s control, are highly visible, and are
subject to stereotypes. 66 A relevant difference cited by opponents was
that, unlike racial minorities, women comprised a majority of the
population and were thus capable of protecting their interests by
voting. 67 Additionally, Professor Freund distinguished classifications
based on sex and race by using a sports analogy: “To hold separate
Olympic competitions for whites and blacks would be deeply repugnant
to our sensibilities. Do we—should we—feel the same repugnance, that
same sense of degradation, at the separate competitions for men and
women?”68
Although widespread support initially existed for a judicial
solution, dissatisfaction with the Nixon administration increased
support for an ERA. 69 During the 1960s, the Presidential Commission
on the Status of Women recommended working toward expanding the
Fourteenth Amendment’s coverage. 70 As opponents of the ERA argued,
the scope of the Equal Protection Clause had already expanded to new
classifications in recent years. 71 This approach changed as the women’s
rights movement grew frustrated with the Nixon administration’s
failure to follow through on its promises. 72 For example, the
administration refused to support a bill to expand equal pay. 73
Disappointment with President Nixon’s inactivity and perceived
63. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 137–38 (D.S.C. 1970), aff’d, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
64. See, e.g., Crystal N. Feimster, The Impact of Racial and Sexual Politics on Women’s History, 99
J. AM. HIST. 822 (2012) (arguing for the inclusion of race in feminist histories).
65. See Juliet Eilperin, New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. POST (Mar. 28,
2007), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/27/AR2007032702357.html
[https://perma.cc/ZE82-T58C].
66. Schepard, supra note 53, at 1507–08.
67. Id. at 1505.
68. Freund, supra note 47, at 240.
69. See Robert Sherrill, That Equal-Rights Amendment—What, Exactly, Does it Mean?, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 20, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/20/archives/that-equalrights-amendmentwhatexactly-does-it-mean-the-equalrights.html [https://perma.cc/V8P9-JDNT].
70. Id.
71. Freund, supra note 47, at 235 (including classifications based on “poverty, illegitimacy,
[and] duration of residence”).
72. Sherrill, supra note 69.
73. Id. (“[T]hey wouldn’t even approve a bill to extend equal pay to executive and professional
administrative women.”).
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changes in the administration’s dedication to women’s rights resulted
in a swell of support for the ERA among women’s rights advocates.74
B. The Debate over Process
Opponents of the ERA attacked Congress’s approval process,
claiming that it failed to allow for sufficient deliberation. 75 The House
had no committee hearings on the ERA and only one hour of floor
debate preceded the vote. 76 Moreover, the House’s Judiciary
Committee, then headed by a known opponent of the ERA, was
circumvented by a discharge petition. 77 Commenting on this rapid
progress, Senator Ervin remarked that he “doubt[ed] if anybody [in the
House] except the chief proponent of the bill gave more than 15 minutes’
study . . . before they voted” and noted feeling unprepared for the
Senate’s deliberations. 78 The lack of deliberation was especially
egregious, opponents argued, because the ERA’s equality of rights
language raised significant questions about its legal implications.79
How would laws that classified based on sex be equalized (e.g., would
pro-female labor protections be overturned or also provided to men)? 80
How would the ERA interact with other constitutional rights (e.g., the
right to privacy)? 81 In addition, the ERA’s passage could affect broad
swaths of existing state and federal law. 82 A 1972 study by Maryland’s
Attorney General found that the ERA would impact 227 “clauses and
concepts” in Maryland’s legal codes, 83 and there was no reason to think
Maryland was exceptional in this regard. 84 Such “farreaching and
inflexible” changes, opponents argued, “ought surely not be brought
about as the half-hidden implication of a constitutional motto.” 85

74. Id.
75. Id.; see also Freund, supra note 47, at 241 (“[W]hen basic, commonplace, recurring
questions are raised and left unanswered by text or legislative history, one can only infer a want of
candor or of comprehension.”).
76. Sherrill, supra note 69.
77. Id. (explaining how a discharge petition can help “free legislation from committee
bottlenecks” through a procedural tactic that allows a bill to be brought to the floor of the House by
a committee without a report from the committee).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Equal Rights Amendment May Be a Mixed Blessing, CHI. DAILY DEF., June 6, 1972, at
8.
81. See Lisa Baldez, The U.S. Might Ratify the ERA. What Would Change?, WASH. POST (Jan.
23,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/23/us-might-ratify-era-whatwould-change/ [https://perma.cc/YYH2-8XAY].
82. See, e.g., Says Husbands May Pay Wives Wages Under Proposed Law, SUN, Feb. 10, 1926, at 26.
83. Sexism in the Statutes, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1972, at A20.
84. Freund, supra note 47, at 238.
85. Id.
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C. The Amendment in Action
Proponents and opponents of the ERA also debated its potential
consequences. 86 In particular, proponents focused on the economics of
marriage, including a husband’s support obligations, a wife’s property
rights, and a couple’s ability to receive fair financing. 87 In all states at
the time, “husbands [were] primarily liable for the support of their
wives and children.” 88 Proponents of the ERA argued that the
amendment would ease this financial burden on men and improve the
enforcement of support laws. 89 On the other hand, Senator Sam Ervin
of North Carolina asserted that the ERA would destroy any right to
support, because for every right, there must also be a duty. 90 By
equating the rights of women and men, their legal responsibilities to
one another in family law would become nonexistent. 91 Proponents of
the ERA also contended that the amendment would overturn state laws
requiring a married woman to obtain her husband’s consent before
selling property. 92 Moreover, in community property states, married
women may hold an equal share in the ownership of property acquired
during marriage; yet in all these states, “except [for] Texas and
Washington, the husband has the power of management and control
over the community property.” 93 The ERA ensures that laws vesting
community property management “in the husband alone,” or those
favoring husbands based on wage earning, would no longer be valid.94
Lastly, proponents of the ERA pointed to the difficulties women face in
getting loans from financial institutions. 95 Despite being financially
qualified, some single women alleged they were denied loans without a
male co-signer. 96 Additionally, a married woman’s income was often
not counted, or even discounted, in calculating mortgage loan

86. See Baldez, supra note 81.
87. See Brown et al., supra note 41, at 937–38, 946–53.
88. Id. at 944.
89. Trude Forsher, The Blind Mice and the Equal Rights Amendment, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1972, at
E7. According to a study by the Citizens’ Advisory Council on the Status of Women, support could
“generally be enforced only through an action for separation or divorce,” and alimony was rarely
awarded in these cases. Id.
90. Sherrill, supra note 69 (“For a person to have a right, it means somebody else must have a
corresponding legal duty.”).
91. Id.
92. Eileen Shanahan, Women’s Rights: A Vote for Equal Status—And Equal Burdens, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1972, at E6.
93. Brown et al., supra note 41, at 946–47. In every common law ownership state, Married
Women’s Property Acts largely prevented this type of financial control by husbands over their
wives. Id. at 948.
94. Brown et al., supra note 41, at 946–47.
95. See Georgia Dullea, Women Demanding Equal Treatment in Mortgage Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 1972, at R1.
96. Id.
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eligibility. 97 Bankers argued this practice was necessary to protect
against the risk of a married woman quitting work to have a baby. 98
Consequences of the ERA that opponents hoped to avoid included
women’s inclusion in the draft, elimination of female-specific labor
protections, and invalidation of statutes banning same-sex marriage.99
Although Congress could have required women to register for the draft
before the ERA was proposed, the amendment would have made
registration compulsory. 100 Senator Ervin suggested an amendment to
the ERA excluding women from the draft, but this proposal was soundly
defeated. 101 Resistance to this consequence of the ERA was expressed
most simply by California Senate Leader James Mills, who said: “Anyone
who tries to tell me to vote for a measure that would send my two small
daughters off to war isn’t going to get anywhere.” 102 On the other hand,
Representative Griffiths believed that the ERA would help eliminate the
draft entirely. 103 Other proponents of the ERA emphasized the benefits
of military service104 and pointed out that women’s exclusion from the
draft hurt their social status. 105
Some labor unions, such as the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations, fought against the ERA because
they believed the amendment would invalidate labor laws benefitting
women. 106 These labor laws preserve women’s minimum wages,107
enforce maximum hour requirements, and limit the physical
strenuousness of women’s work. 108 As child-bearers, women arguably
needed legal protection from working too much or too hard. 109
Additionally, some individuals worried that by supporting women

97. Id. (“Bankers argue that working mothers are unrealistic to expect full credit for their
paychecks.”).
98. See id.
99. See Victoria Irwin, The Equal Rights Amendment: The Case Against, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May
6, 1980), https://www.csmonitor.com/1980/0506/050606.html [https://perma.cc/B2G3-PTQX]; Sherill,
supra note 69.
100. Hyde, supra note 52.
101. Shanahan, supra note 29.
102. Jean Murphy, Crucial Test for Equal Rights Proposal, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1972, at F1.
103. See id.
104. Brown et al., supra note 41, at 968 (“Veterans receive educational scholarships . . . loans,
[and] preference in government employment.”).
105. According to NYU Law Professor Norman Dorsen, “when women are excluded from the
draft—the most serious and onerous duty of citizenship—their status is generally reduced.” Id.
106. Murphy, supra note 102. However, according to the Secretary-Treasurer of the California
AFL-CIO John Henning, they “wouldn’t object if the protection women [then] enjoy[ed] [was]
extended to men.” Id.
107. Id.
108. Russell Kirk, Equal Rights Amendment Means Equal Misery, BALT. SUN, May 10, 1972, at A15.
109. Id. (“There exist very good reasons why women should be exempted from excessive hours
of labor and exhausting duties.”).
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joining the workforce, the ERA would strain the relationship between
mothers and their children. 110
Lastly, state statutes banning same-sex marriage could have been
invalidated under the ERA as a sex-based classification. 111 Senator Bayh
rejected this interpretation as long as marriage licenses were denied to
both male-male and female-female couples. 112 But Professor Freund
pointed out that Bayh’s reasoning ran counter to the invalidation of
antimiscegenation statutes banning interracial marriages under the
Fourteenth Amendment, as held in Loving v. Virginia, which impacted all
races equally. 113 Although Emerson’s article suggested that an ERA
should require strict sex equality, it also mentions an exception for
“particular attributes of individuals,” even if they are unique to one
sex. 114 Therefore, statutes banning same-sex marriage could have been
defended on the grounds that only different-sex couples can
procreate. 115 However, supporters of same-sex marriage could have
responded that Emerson intended for such exceptions to strict sex
equality to be “closely, directly and narrowly confined to . . . unique
physical characteristic[s].” 116 There are many different-sex couples who
cannot procreate and others who do not want to have children. 117
Neither group was prevented from marrying by the statutes banning
same-sex marriage at the time, thus these laws were not narrowly
confined to procreation. 118

110. Id.
111. Charles C. Bridges, Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 583 (1973).
112. Id. at 583–84.
113. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 12 (1967); Bridges, supra note 111, at 584.
114. Brown et al., supra note 41, at 892–93.
115. Bridges, supra note 111, at 586–87.
116. Brown et al., supra note 41, at 894.
117. Bridges, supra note 111, at 587–88.
118. Id. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court made significant strides toward LGBTQ+
equality by overruling a Texas statute making it a crime for two adult individuals of the same sex to
engage in private sexual conduct, subsequently holding in a 6-3 decision that the Fourteenth
Amendment provides constitutional protections to personal decisions about marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, the raising of children, and education. Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Specifically, the Court found that because the statute applied to adult
males engaging in consensual sex within the privacy of their home, this law impacted these
individuals’ liberty-related interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteen
Amendment, which overruled the precedent previously set by the Supreme Court in Bowers v.
Hardwick, an older case which held that there was no constitutional right to engage in “consensual
sodomy” in the bedroom of an individual’s home. Id. at 578; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence. Ultimately, Lawrence helped lay a foundation for subsequent
Supreme Court decisions affirming LGBTQ+ rights, such as the granting of marriage rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause via Obergefell v. Hodges and the extension of
employment protections for LGBTQ+ workers in Bostock v. Clayton County. See Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S .Ct. 1731 (2020).
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D. Prognosis
Having reviewed this historical background, we can return to the
question with which we began this Part: what is the significance of the
revived interest in the ERA? On the one hand, because of the expired
deadline and revocations of ratification by state legislatures, the recent
approval of the ERA by multiple states may not have any legal
consequence.119 On the other, these ratifications are highly symbolic of a
renewed interest in women’s rights 120 as evidenced by the #MeToo
movement. Similarly, the first introduction of an ERA bill in Congress
followed the Nineteenth Amendment becoming law, and the women’s
rights movement of the 1960s preceded Congressional approval of the
ERA in 1972. 121 As with these historical legal shifts, renewed interest in
the ERA and the #MeToo movement may signify that we are on the
precipice of social change that may provide opportunity for
corresponding legal transformations. Furthermore, although Emerson
doubted that Equal Protection jurisprudence would expand to protect
against sex-based classifications, 122 the Court began to apply
intermediate scrutiny review to these classifications in 1976.123
Intermediate scrutiny asks whether a law is “substantially related” to an
“important” government interest. 124 Although this standard may fall
short of the absolute equality envisioned by Emerson, 125 it provides
greater protection than the deferential rational basis standard that
applied when Emerson wrote his article. The rational basis standard
asks merely whether a law is “rationally related” to a “legitimate” state
interest, and it nearly always results in government victory.126 Lastly,
even if the ERA had become law, some were concerned about how great
an effect it would exert on sex discrimination in practice. 127 Bias by
decision-makers within organizations could continue to permeate the
119. See Law, supra note 21 (“[T]he Constitution does not set deadlines for amendment
ratification. In fact, the Constitution sets a requirement that one Congress can’t bind a future
Congress, so modern legislators could alter the [deadline].”).
120. Brown et al., supra note 41, at 901.
121. Law, supra note 21.
122. Brown et al., supra note 41, at 875.
123. The Supreme Court first applied the intermediate scrutiny standard to sex-based
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause in 1976. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). This
standard requires the government to prove that the policy being challenged is substantially related
to an important government interest. Id. at 197.
124. Id. at 190.
125. Brown et al., supra note 41, at 875.
126. See, e.g., Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D.S.C. 1970) (“[T]his Court cannot
declare as a matter of law that a legislative classification, premised as it is on respectable
pedagogical opinion, is without any rational justification and violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.”), aff’d, 401 U.S. 951 (1971); see Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme
Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999).
127. See Sherrill, supra note 69.
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workplace and undermine women’s equality. 128 Although the ERA
becoming law would be a powerful symbol, ratification may not directly
influence the hearts and minds of our leaders in the public and private
sectors. 129 This reality reveals the limitations of legal solutions to sexbased discrimination. The next Part addresses a brief history of the
developing jurisprudence in sexual harassment law.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
Sexual harassment is legally actionable under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 130 But when the Civil Rights Act was enacted, “the
term ‘sexual harassment’ had not yet been coined and there was no
secure legal remedy for . . . sexual propositioning, gender baiting, and
other forms of sexualized behaviors.” 131 Activists transformed the public
and judicial understanding of sexual harassment from a private matter
outside of the workplace, to an illegal form of discrimination. 132 To
dismantle the judiciary’s resistance to accepting harassment as a form
of discrimination, activists emphasized that both men and women
could be harassed. 133
In 1979, Professor MacKinnon observed that women were valued in
the workplace based on “men’s perceptions of their potential to be
sexually harassed.” 134 In her work, Professor MacKinnon referred to the
sociological scholarship of Talcott Parsons, who focused on the
stereotypes of working women as office housekeepers, “ego-build[ers],”
and “sex objects.”135 Professor MacKinnon reflected on one woman’s
observation that the best jobs went to the most attractive women: “It
was a woman’s fate to either endure the migratory hands of a male boss
128. See Shanahan, supra note 92 (“There are, for example, the feelings of many people who just
don’t feel women are capable of being engineers, crane operators, elective officials, business
executives or judges and who are in a position to deny women the training and experience that
would permit them to achieve these and many other positions.”); see also Sherrill, supra note 69
(“But the statistics clearly indicate that, even with a new constitutional amendment for leverage,
women would have trouble dislodging official deadweight resistance.”).
129. See Shanahan, supra note 92.
130. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; Facts About Sexual Harassment,
EEOC
(Jan.
15,
1997),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-sex.cfm
U.S.
[https://perma.cc/VLA8-DYSM] (“Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that violates
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”).
131. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 116 (1st ed. 2019).
132. See id.
133. Siegel, supra note 9, at 11.
134. Ginia Bellafante, Before #MeToo, There Was Catharine A. MacKinnon and Her Book ‘Sexual
Harassment of Working Women’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/books
/review/metoo-workplace-sexual-harassment-catharine-mackinnon.html [https://perma.cc/2VDVCJN3] (quoting CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 23 (1979)).
135. Id. (quoting MACKINNON, supra note 134, at 18).
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and earn a decent living, or wish she looked good enough to invite the
indignities.” 136 Based on these observations, Professor MacKinnon
theorized that sexual harassment perpetuated women’s inequality and
that without change, women would continue to be prevented from
professionally advancing. 137
The Supreme Court identified sexual harassment as a Title VII
violation in the 1986 case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 138 In a
unanimous decision, the Court held that “when a supervisor sexually
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor
‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.” 139 In this case, a bank teller claimed
that her company’s vice president had repeatedly touched her in public
and raped her. 140 The Court drew on Title VII’s “terms, conditions, or
privileges” of employment language to hold that unwelcomed sexual
advances that create a hostile or offensive work environment constitute
illegal discrimination. 141 In its analysis, the Supreme Court compared
sexual harassment with racial harassment (which was already illegal)
and found both practices to be equally arbitrary barriers to workplace
equality. 142
More specifically, the Court declared that harassment “must be
both subjectively and objectively offensive” for it to be illegal, requiring
the plaintiff to prove that they were actually offended and that a
reasonable person would also be offended by the conduct. 143 The Court
refined this test further in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
where it stated: “In same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry
requires careful consideration of the social context in which the
particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.” 144
Sexual harassment law is most powerful when it holds an employer
vicariously liable for the unlawful acts of its employees. 145 Courts are

136. Id. (citing MACKINNON, supra note 134, at 22). But see Laura Fox, Unattractive Women Are Victims
of Sexual Assault Too, MEDIUM (Jan. 29, 2021), https://medium.com/fearless-she-wrote/unattractivewomen-are-victims-of-sexual-assault-too-9592bde341af [https://perma.cc/XB5N-WNSP] (explaining
that attractiveness is not a necessary condition for someone to be subjected to sexual assault).
137. Bellafante, supra note 134 (quoting MACKINNON, supra note 134, at 215–21).
138. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57–58 (1986).
139. Id. at 64.
140. Id. at 60.
141. Id. at 66–67.
142. Id. at 67 (“Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in
return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.” (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
902 (11th Cir. 1982))).
143. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229,
237 (2018) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993)).
144. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
145. See Martha Chamallas, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex Exception, 48 VAL. UNIV. L. REV.
133, 135–37 (2013).
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hesitant, however, to hold the employer liable. 146 If the harasser is a
coworker of the survivor, their employer is held liable only when
negligence can be proven (i.e., when the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to act). 147 If the harasser supervises
the survivor, the employer is strictly liable if the supervisor made a
“tangible employment action” against the survivor, such as a demotion,
firing, or pay-cut. 148 In the absence of a “tangible employment action,”
the employer is presumed liable unless they are able to prove an
affirmative defense. Based on Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, courts
consider whether the employer took reasonable measures to prevent or
redress the harassment and whether the plaintiff “unreasonably failed
to take advantage” of these measures. 149
The seemingly subjective and unpredictable results of sexual
harassment cases are a product of the ineffectual nature of the laws
addressing sexual harassment as well as the many avenues by which
employers can avoid liability. 150 The Supreme Court has distinguished
civility code, where employers outline “wide swaths” of unacceptable
conduct, from harassment law; unlike civility code, harassment law
should not apply to “usual workplace interactions.” 151 Beyond the
distinction between harassment law and civility code, scholars have
remarked that the Court’s requirement that actionable hostile
environment harassment be “severe or pervasive” has excused
egregious conduct. 152 Judith Johnson believes that lower court judges
overemphasize this requirement; instead they should focus on whether
the work environment in a sexual harassment case is “objectively hostile
or abusive.” 153 Elizabeth Tippett suggests that the stories voiced through
the #MeToo movement may provide the context necessary to properly
evaluate the severity or pervasiveness of the alleged conduct in
harassment cases, as expressed from the survivor’s perspective. 154 This
146. See id.
147. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998) (“District Courts and Courts of
Appeals . . . [have] uniformly judg[ed] co-worker harassment under a negligence standard.”).
148. Id. at 808 (“No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s
harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or
undesirable reassignment.” (citation omitted)).
149. Id. at 807.
150. See Tippett, supra note 143, at 243; see also Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Boss Grab
Your Breasts? That’s Not (Legally) Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/11/29/opinion/harassment-employees-laws-.html [https://perma.cc/6J5J-SJHH] (stating that
what constitutes “severe or pervasive” harassment is an area of uncertainty for judges).
151. Tippett, supra note 143, at 290, 242 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
152. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see, e.g., Judith Johnson, License to
Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment to Be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates
Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85, 85–86 (2003).
153. Johnson, supra note 152, at 85 (citation omitted).
154. Tippett, supra note 143, at 242.
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additional context may push judges “toward a more lenient standard”
for identifying harassment, focusing on “whether the conduct is
objectively hostile or abusive,” and increasing survivors’
compensation. 155
Jurisprudence regarding vicarious liability is also unclear. 156
Employers evade liability by reacting to complaints with very little
meaningful action. 157 Survivors are deemed to have declined an
employer’s intervention if they fail to report a complaint until months
after misconduct occurred. 158 Thus, unsurprisingly, application of the
Faragher defense has produced favorable results for employers. 159 For an
employer to succeed, they must simply maintain a policy that
“constitutes ‘reasonable care,’” “regardless of whether plaintiffs
reported harassment.” 160
Courts often dismiss sexual harassment claims due to the broad
judicial discretion afforded in these cases, 161 reporting requirements,162
and doubts surrounding women’s credibility. 163 For these reasons, the
effectiveness of legally prohibiting sexual harassment is limited,
resulting in pervasive inequality between men and women. 164 Sexual
harassment is “built into [our] structural social hierarchies.” 165 It cannot
be eradicated without removing broad cultural inequalities embedded
elsewhere in the law. 166
The #MeToo movement inspired legislatures to fill the wide gaps
left in sexual harassment law which have allowed discrimination to
occur across all levels of all industries. 167 Professor MacKinnon notes
that #MeToo refuted the assumption that the person who reports sexual
abuse is lying. 168 Although “[s]exual harassment law prepared the
ground, . . . it is today’s movement that is shifting gender hierarchy’s
155. See id. at 243.
156. See Chamallas, supra note 145, at 177.
157. See id.
158. Id.at 178.
159. See David Sherwyn, Michale Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel
Your 1-800 Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative
Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1289 (2001) (“[O]ur analyses reveal
that courts are prepared to conclude that a good policy constitutes ‘reasonable care’ and that
employers can prevail regardless of whether plaintiffs reported harassment.”).
160. Id.
161. See Tippett, supra note 143, at 243.
162. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 159.
163. MacKinnon, supra note 6.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Cf. id.
167. See Erik A. Christiansen, How Are the Laws Sparked by #MeToo Affecting Workplace
Harassment?, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 8, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
publications/litigation-news/featured-articles/2020/new-state-laws-expand-workplace-protectionssexual-harassment-victims/ [https://perma.cc/E7E9-AXT7].
168. See MacKinnon, supra note 6.
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tectonic plates.” 169 The next Part outlines actions taken by state
legislatures regarding sexual harassment in response to the #MeToo
movement.
III. STATE LAW INITIATIVES: SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS FOR
CLAIMS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
The #MeToo movement has not left state legislatures unmoved.170
Before the COVID-19 pandemic caused widespread governmental
shutdowns and delays in 2020, state legislatures reviewed over 200 bills
to strengthen protections against workplace harassment. 171 Nearly 400
state legislators from 42 states and the District of Columbia took the
#20StatesBy2020 Pledge to affirm their commitment to supporting and
working with survivors to strengthen protections against sexual
harassment in 20 states by 2020. 172
Initiatives from state legislatures propelled changes to state law
until approximately March 2020, when the global COVID-19 pandemic
caused many governmental bodies to shut down operations or
redistribute resources to emergency relief efforts. 173 This sudden shift
delayed legislation connected with #MeToo efforts in the midst of an
economic recession that caused high levels of job loss among women
and pushed others out of the workplace due to school shutdowns.174
During the pandemic, employees were “asked to do so much more for
so much less.” 175 Additionally, sexual harassment increased throughout
the pandemic, especially in the food service industry, where tips and
pay decreased. 176

169.
170.

Id. (alteration in original).
David A. Lieb, Half of States Act as #MeToo Sexual Misconduct Claims Mount, ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Aug.
26,
2018),
https://apnews.com/article/83caf61841a84db3bbd85648bce8fec5
[https://perma.cc/WS4U-2PAZ].
171. #20StatesBy2020 Letter, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://nwlc.org/resources
/20-states-by-2020-letter/ [https://perma.cc/AEZ3-M75J].
172. See id.
173. See, e.g., Keither Ridler, Idaho Legislature Shuts Down Due to COVID-19 Outbreak, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Mar. 19, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/legislature-coronavirus-pandemic-idaho9cc12cf52aecb26dd4f884e752317d8c [https://perma.cc/D4L9-GUSU].
174. See, e.g., Sexual Harassment During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Health, Care, and Domestic Work,
U.N. WOMEN (July 7, 2020), https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/events/2020/07/event-sexualharassment-during-the-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/QFD9-K7HQ].
175. Amanda Kludt, Hostility, Harassment, and Low Wages Are Keeping Many Restaurant Workers
Home, EATER’S DIGEST (Apr. 27, 2021, 10:55 AM), https://www.eater.com/2021/4/27/22404238/
restaurant-labor-shortage-saru-jayamaran-one-fair-wage [https://perma.cc/E3RB-DUBZ].
176. Id.; see also Natasha Dailey, Hostility and Harassment Against Women and Minorities Increased
with Remote Work During the Pandemic, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 1, 2021, 9:23 AM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/harassment-hostility-against-women-minorities-increased-whileworking-remote-study-2021-3 [https://perma.cc/V5HV-TNXG].
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The legacy of reforms enacted between 2017 and 2019, however,
generated changes that proved influential in 2020; for example,
California 177 and Illinois 178 instituted changes, such as new laws
extending deadlines for filing sexual harassment claims, aiming to
prevent sexual harassment, and voiding “no rehire” provisions in
settlement agreements. These laws include California’s SHARE Act, 179
which extends the deadline for filing workplace harassment-related
retaliation claims from one year to up to three years. 180 California’s
deadline is six times longer than the federal standard, and this
extension may influence other states and federal regulations. 181
One of the most pernicious gaps left in sexual harassment law—a
gap these recent regulations have begun to address 182—is harassers’
ability to coerce survivors into silence through the use of confidentiality
provisions in settlements. 183 Also known as non-disclosure agreements
(NDAs), these provisions ensure that claimants promise secrecy in
return for a settlement payment. 184 These agreements initially silenced
survivors in the “sexual-abuse scandals [that have] bubbl[ed] out of
Hollywood, Capitol Hill, and corporate boardrooms” in recent years. 185
That is not to say that legal settlements of sexual harassment claims are
always malicious. Settlements are generally quicker, less expensive, and
less burdensome on the judicial system; 186 they provide certainty for

177. For an overview, see Governor Newsom Signs Worker Protection Bills Addressing Sexual
Harassment, Wages, and Health Protections, OFF. OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/10/10/governor-newsom-signs-worker-protection-bills-addressingsexual-harassment-wages-and-health-protections/ [https://perma.cc/M2P3-TMBA].
178. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96/1-1 (2021).
179. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12960 (West 2019).
180. See Adam Abrahms & Story Cunningham-White, AB 9 Extends Employee’s Statute of
Limitations to File Discrimination Charges in California to Three Years—Employers, This Affects You!, JD
SUPRA (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ab-9-extends-employees-statute-of31079/ [https://perma.cc/H9MV-H6QN].
181. Id.
182. See Annie Hill, Nondisclosure Agreements: Sexual Harassment and the Contract of Silence, UNIV.
MINN. GENDER POL’Y REP. (Nov. 14, 2017), https://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/nondisclosureagreements-sexual-harassment-and-the-contract-of-silence/ [https://perma.cc/4R8T-QS9A].
183. See Jeffrey Steven Gordon, Silence for Sale, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (2020) (arguing that
some NDAs that restrict harassment survivors from speaking out should be voided because they
violate the public policy of free expression).
184. See Joan C. Williams, Jodi L. Short, Margot Brooks, Hilary Hardcastle, Tiffanie Ellis &
Rayna Saron, What’s Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law After the Norm Cascade, 2019 MICH.
STATE L. REV. 139, 197 (“NDAs (or confidentiality agreements) are contractual agreements to keep
certain specified information secret.”).
185. David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 171 (2019)
(quoting Michelle Chen, How Forced Arbitration and Non-Disclosure Agreements Can Perpetuate Hostile Work
Environments, NATION (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-forced-arbitrationand-non-disclosure-agreements-can-perpetuate-hostile-work-environments/ [https://perma.cc/
75TT-TLLH]).
186. See Alexandria Murphy, Better Late than Never: Why the USOC Took so Long to Fix a Failing
System for Protecting Olympic Athletes from Abuse, 26 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 157, 193 (2019)
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both parties, and they may be less emotionally taxing for the claimant
than drawn-out litigation. 187 Moreover, some claimants may prefer
NDAs to avoid the stigma associated with bringing a sexual assault
claim. 188 NDAs also provide claimants with leverage against harassers in
settlement negotiations; 189 alleged harassers are likely to pay more in a
settlement if the claimant promises not to discuss the incident(s). 190
The #MeToo movement has highlighted the significant drawbacks
of NDAs in the context of sexual misconduct. 191 When it comes to sexual
misconduct, the public is entitled to know about illegal activities
occurring in the workplace, particularly if that behavior is repeated. 192
Shielding this misconduct from the public eye may harm the public’s
faith in corporate governance (if sexual misconduct is later revealed,
despite NDAs). 193 Similarly, investors deserve to know the legal risks
faced by the companies in which they invest. 194 NDAs prevent “the free
flow of information in markets” and can thus harm investors if the
underlying issues are not addressed, ultimately impacting the value of a
firm. 195 And although these risks are inherent to every NDA, they are
particularly pernicious here, where they may shield repeat offenders
from public accountability. 196
Additionally, sexual misconduct may harm public health and safety
if the perpetrator is a serial offender (as is frequently the case). 197
Discussing misconduct can prevent future misconduct, encourage
other survivors to discuss their own experiences, 198 or help claimants

(noting that without enforceable NDAs sexual assault and harassment cases may clog up the court
systems); see also Williams et al., supra note 184, at 204 (“Sexual harassment lawsuits are costly [and]
lengthy.”).
187. See Vasundhara Prasad, If Anyone Is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the Culture of Silence Around
Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507,
2516 (2018) (stating that litigating sexual harassment claims is difficult and that NDA agreements
can be designed to protect both the plaintiff and defendant).
188. See id. (observing that sexual harassment claimants worry that a prospective future
employer would label them litigious if they knew of a settlement).
189. See Williams et al., supra note 184, at 220–21 (arguing that making sexual harassment
NDAs unenforceable would cause defendants to either refuse to settle the case or reduce their
willingness to pay in a settlement).
190. See Murphy, supra note 186 (“Many victims prefer to sign an NDA because an NDA . . .
gives financial restitution, a large monetary sum.”).
191. See Hill, supra note 182.
192. See Williams et al., supra note 184, at 213–14.
193. See id. (noting that some courts have found “integrity in corporate governance” as a public
policy exception to NDAs).
194. Id. at 215.
195. Id. at 213–15.
196. See Symposium, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. 76 (2018).
197. Williams et al., supra note 184, at 215–16.
198. See Prasad, supra note 187, at 2515–16 (explaining that perpetrators of sexual harassment
seek NDAs so that they can continue misbehaving).

386

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:2

process the trauma they experienced. 199 Not discussing it, on the other
hand, may normalize the misconduct. 200 Survivors, especially those
who are new to their jobs, may believe that this misconduct is inherent
in the workplace. 201 They may even leave their chosen field of work to
avoid future harassment. 202 To be clear, we must avoid reforms that
place the burden of rectifying the sexist workplace on the survivor—one
risk of banning the NDA altogether. 203 But #MeToo has demonstrated
that NDAs’ unregulated use in the context of sexual misconduct must
be reined in. 204
In the wake of the #MeToo movement, confidentiality and
nondisclosure agreements have been viewed as “‘encourag[ing] further
bad behavior on behalf of the sexual harassers, leading to more victims
and more confidentiality agreements.’” 205 Public discourse surrounding
sexual harassment and NDAs has increased as journalists are “eager to
amplify the voices of those who have suffered in silence,” 206 including in
the political sphere. During a 2020 Presidential Debate, Senator
Elizabeth Warren questioned fellow Democratic candidate, former
New York City Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, about his treatment of
women. 207 Warren asked if Bloomberg would release women at
Bloomberg’s company and foundation from their NDAs regarding
sexual harassment and gender discrimination in their workplace. 208
Warren credited her questioning of Bloomberg to her intolerance “for
the kind of behavior the ‘Me too’ movement has exposed” and the ways

199. See Williams et al., supra note 184, at 217–18 (“[D]iscussion about incidents of harassment
with co-workers, friends, and family can help individuals recognize their own experiences as
harassment and seek help.”).
200. See Prasad, supra note 187, at 2517 (“[A] widespread use of [NDAs] creates a culture of
impunity.”); see also Murphy, supra note 186, at 194 (“Part of the grooming process for sexual abusers
is silencing the victim through threats, persuasion, and tools such as NDAs.”).
201. Williams et al., supra note 184, at 213.
202. Id.
203. To avoid that problem, some scholars have proposed conditional reforms to NDAs in this
context, banning only certain clauses and placing particular requirements on sexual misconduct
settlements. For instance, see Symposium, supra note 196.
204. See Prasad, supra note 187, at 2508 (“There are many beneficial purposes of NDAs, but in
the context of sexual assault and sexual harassment, they are incredibly pernicious contracts.”).
205. Tammy Binford, Era of #MeToo and Tell-All Books Triggering New Thinking About NDAs, HP
DAILY ADVISOR (Sep. 10, 2018), https://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2018/09/10/era-of-metoo-and-tellall-books-triggering-new-thinking-about-ndas/ [https://perma.cc/P89S-8CB].
206. Rachael L. Jones & Virginia Hamrick, Reporting on NDAs and #MeToo: How the Press May
Obtain Standing to Challenge NDAs, 35 COMMC’NS LAW., J. MEDIA, INFO. & COMMC’NS L. 7, 10 (2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/communications_lawyer/fall2019/cl
_35_n1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T5P-WZC3].
207. Hanna Trudo, Warren Torches Bloomberg on #MeToo and Secret Settlements, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 20,
2020, 3:52 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/elizabeth-warren-torches-michael-bloomberg-onmetoo-and-secret-settlements [https://perma.cc/943F-WKWL].
208. Id.
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that NDAs silence women’s hostile workplace experiences. 209 In 2018,
President Donald Trump’s NDA with Stephanie Clifford, also known as
Stormy Daniels, was abandoned when Clifford chose to publicly
disclose details of her sexual relations with Trump.210 Clifford joined a
growing number of women breaking their NDAs to warn other women
of the harassment and hostile workplaces they endured; as the #MeToo
movement has grown “we have seen more women willing to tell their
stories in the face of possibly being sued for breaking their NDAs.” 211 As
more women continue to challenge NDAs, “public policy, agencies and
the judiciary are more open to not enforcing these contracts when there
is a public interest to know.” 212
State legislatures have considered the #MeToo movement as they
debate whether to prohibit the use of NDAs in settlements of sexual
assault or harassment claims. For example, the Assembly Judiciary
Committee in California specifically noted the sexual misconduct
occurring in Hollywood in its analysis of proposed NDA legislation.213 A
bill in New York to restrict NDAs in the context of sexual misconduct
was proposed on the heels of the #MeToo movement. 214 Illinois passed
the Workplace Transparency Act in 2019, which included a prohibition
of NDAs covering instances of sexual harassment. 215 In the debates
leading up to the passage of the Workplace Transparency Act, Illinois
House Representative Anne Stava-Murray remarked: “[T]he difference
between the last time this came forward and now is the #MeToo
movement.” 216
Below, we discuss the different legal solutions adopted by state
legislatures to address the problem posed by NDAs in the sexual
harassment context.

209. Id.; see also Natalie Gontcharova, This Is the One Way Elizabeth Warren Has Already Won,
REFINERY29 (Feb. 28, 2020, 3:20 PM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2020/02/9486888/
elizabeth-warren-election-win-bloomberg-me-too-women [https://perma.cc/25L4-YYUZ].
210. Tom Lutz, Judge Orders Donald Trump to Pay Stormy Daniels $44,000 in Legal Fees, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 22, 2020, 4:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug/22/donald-trumpstormy-daniels-legal-fees-non-disclosure-agreement [https://perma.cc/Z37N-ZVT4].
211. Nina Burleigh, Stormy Daniels Defies Trump to Join Chorus of Women Violating Nondisclosure
Agreements About Sex, Abuse and Harassment, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 8, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://
www.newsweek.com/stormy-trump-2016-election-sex-hush-money-835646
[https://perma.cc/G88C55X8].
212. Id.
213. See ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, SB820 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS: CONFIDENTIALITY 1
(2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB820
[https://perma.cc/H9FF-5CTV] (select “06/30/18- Assembly Judiciary” under “Bill Analysis”).
214. ASSEMB. B. A8421, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019), https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/
bills/2019/A8421 [https://perma.cc/34UN-6E4B].
215. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96/1-1, 96/1-25, 96/1-30 (2021).
216. House of Representatives, Transcription Debate, 40th Legislative Day, 101st Gen. Assemb.,
40th Sess., at 118 (Ill. 2019).
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A. Confidentiality Prohibitions Applying to Claimants Generally
California, New York, and Nevada have the broadest prohibitions
on NDAs involving claims of sexual misconduct, banning many
confidentiality clauses. 217 Confidentiality provisions are commonplace
in “nearly every settlement agreement resolving a legal dispute.” 218 In
settlement agreements concerning sexual harassment of an employee,
confidentiality clauses bar the employee from communicating details of
the settlement, or the facts that led to the agreement, to anyone. 219
When confidentiality agreements are included in NDAs, they
traditionally prohibit employees from sharing trade and company
secrets, however, they have been extended in some contracts to also
prohibit complaints and disclosures of workplace sexual harassment. 220
California bans the use of NDAs for all claims of sexual misconduct in
civil or administrative actions. 221 Similarly, Nevada prohibits
confidentiality clauses in settlements of criminal sexual misconduct
claims, while New York prohibits them in settlements of all
discrimination claims (e.g., race, gender, and age). 222
B. Confidentiality Prohibitions in Employer-Employee Agreements
Most states that regulate confidentiality provisions covering claims
of sexual misconduct ban these provisions in the employer-employee
context. But there are differences in the statutes. New Mexico,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia prohibit employers from requiring
confidentiality agreements in sexual harassment settlements as a
condition of employment. 223 Illinois, New Jersey, and Oregon, on the
other hand, provide general restrictions preventing employers from
enforcing confidentiality provisions in certain cases. 224 Illinois’ general
restriction prohibits confidentiality provisions if they are unilaterally

217. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12964.5(a)(2) (West 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 10.195(1) (West 2021); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5003-B (McKinney 2021).
218. Ann Fromholz & Jeanette Laba, #MeToo Challenges Confidentiality and Nondisclosure, 41 L.A.
LAW. 12, 12 (May 2018), https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/2018-issues/
may-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMX9-PALK].
219. Id.
220. See id. at 13.
221. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001 (West 2021).
222. § 10.195; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5003-B. When New York’s law was originally passed in 2018, it
referred only to “sexual harassment.” 5003-B. However, the law was later amended to cover all
forms of discrimination. S.B. S6577, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
223. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-36 (LexisNexis 2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-108 (2021); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h(g) (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.01 (2021).
224. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96/1-30(b) (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.8 (West 2021); OR. REV.
STAT. § 659A.370(1) (West 2021).
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decided by the employer. 225 This prohibition applies to all “unlawful
employment practices,” not only claims of sexual misconduct. 226 New
Jersey narrows its prohibition to employer-employee settlements of
alleged discriminatory misconduct. 227 Oregon’s general prohibition is
even more precise, specifying that “sexual assault” is a type of
discrimination that cannot be included in confidentiality provisions. 228
C. Confidentiality Prohibitions for Public Officials
In addition to employment relationships, some states prohibit the
confidential settlement of claims against various public agents. For
example, Louisiana prohibits public agents from including
confidentiality clauses in sexual harassment or assault settlements if
public funds were spent to reach the agreement. 229 Similarly, California
prohibits government agents from entering into confidentiality
agreements, even if the provision would otherwise be allowed under the
state’s exception (which is discussed in the next Section). 230 Tennessee
has a more specific prohibition against confidentiality clauses in the
public sector; it restricts public school districts and other educational
agencies (“local education agencies”) from using confidentiality
provisions in sexual misconduct settlements. 231 These are not the only
states to recognize the issue of sexual misconduct by public agents. The
National Conference of State Legislatures has compiled a list of states
who have recently considered passing a law regarding sexual
harassment in their state legislature. 232 For example, Louisiana Senate
Bill 182 “[p]rovides for reimbursement of taxpayer dollars used to pay
sexual harassment judgments or settlements” and North Carolina
House Bill 817 “[c]reates a confidential process for reporting and
resolving incidents of sexual harassment . . . requires training to
prevent workplace harassment [and] . . . adopts clear sanctions.” 233

225. 96/1-30(b).
226. Id.
227. See § 10:5-12.8.
228. § 659A.370(1)(a)(A).
229. LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5109.1 (2020).
230. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001(c) (West 2021).
231. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-2-131 (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1-103(2) (2021).
232. Legislation on Sexual Harassment in the Legislature, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURE (Feb. 11,
2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/2018-legislative-sexualharassment-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/W66R-32HZ].
233. Id.
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D. State Law Exceptions to Confidentiality Prohibitions
Although the above states limit the reach of confidentiality
provisions, they also recognize circumstances where confidentiality
may be permissible and carve out exceptions to accommodate such
instances. 234 Of the states that have banned confidentiality clauses in
settlements of sexual harassment claims, only Arizona, New Jersey,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia do not provide any exceptions to
their prohibitions.235
Other states allow confidentiality provisions when claimants
request or agree to them. 236 For example, New Mexico law contains a
clause which protects the claimant’s identity when the claimant
requests confidentiality. 237 Both Nevada 238 and California 239 have a
similar exception, but those exceptions do not apply when a
government agency is a party to the agreement. Louisiana permits
public agents to agree to confidentiality clauses provided no public
funds are used to further the settlement. 240 New Mexico has an
exception for when the claimant requests the clause but is later legally
required to disclose the confidential information (e.g., via subpoena).241
Additionally, Nevada, New Mexico, and New York allow the monetary
terms of a settlement to remain confidential. 242
Another common exception applies when the claimant either
requests or agrees to the confidentiality agreement and has time to
contemplate their decision. In addition to other exception
requirements, Illinois requires that an employee have twenty-one days
to consider the confidentiality agreement, and seven days to revoke the
agreement after it has been signed. 243 Similarly, Oregon provides an
exception for when the claimant requests confidentiality and is given
seven days following the agreement to revoke the confidentiality
clause. 244 Oregon also has an exception for when the employer
determines, in good faith, that an employee engaged in illegal

234. See id.
235. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-720 (LexisNexis 2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.8 (2021); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-108 (2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h(g) (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.01 (2021).
236. See Prasad, supra note 187, at 2522.
237. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-36(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2021).
238. NEV. REV. STAT. § 10.195(4)–(5) (2021).
239. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001(c) (West 2021).
240. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5109.1 (2020).
241. § 50-4-36(C).
242. NEV. REV. STAT. § 10.195(6)(b) (2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-36(B)(1) (2021); see N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 5003-B (MCKINNEY 2021) (prohibiting restrictions on the disclosure of the “underlying
facts and circumstances to the claim” only).
243. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96/1-30(a)(5)–(6) (2021).
244. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.370(2)–(3) (2021).
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discrimination. 245 Like Oregon, Washington has an exception to its
general restriction on employers enforcing confidentiality clauses when
the confidentiality was agreed to after the sexual harassment
occurred. 246 Lastly, New York’s more stringent exception allows for
confidentiality when the claimant prefers it, which is presumably a
higher standard than if they request it, as long as they have twenty-one
days to revoke the clause. 247
E. State Law Prohibitions on Waivers of Rights and Remedies
In addition to confidentiality provisions, states have also restricted
waivers of a sexual harassment claimant’s rights and remedies. 248 A
rights and remedies clause outlines which legal rights and remedies the
signer can maintain while remaining in compliance with the
agreement, as well as which legal rights the signer waives. In theory, a
waiver of rights could result in employees “waiv[ing] future claims
based upon illegal activity that occurred after they signed the NDA.”249
Not all states that restrict confidentiality provisions also restrict the
waiver of a claimant’s rights and remedies. 250 For example, Arizona,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, and Virginia all remain silent
on a sexual harassment claimant’s ability to contractually waive their
rights. 251
The states that have addressed this issue fall into two categories.
The first category of states void provisions waiving a claimant’s rights
and remedies. 252 Although a ban in this category has been interpreted to
also ban arbitration, arbitration is not specifically addressed in these

245. Id. § 659A.370(4).
246. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.210(1), (4) (2020).
247. 5003-B.
248. See Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Can an Employee Waive the Right to Bring a Sexual Harassment Claim?, SHRM
(Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/
nondisclosure-agreements-sexual-harassment-claims.aspx [https://perma.cc/SM5X-7FJ3].
249. Id. Some states have gone even further than restricting a claimant’s ability to waive their rights
and remedies and specifically banned mandatory arbitration for sexual misconduct claims. Natalie Dugan,
#TimesUp on Individual Litigation Reform: Combatting Sexual Harassment Through Employee-Driven Action and
Private Regulation, 53 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 247, 256–57 (2020), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/jlsp/
wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2020/01/Vol53-Dugan.pdf [https://perma.cc/MKJ2-8UP5]. However, one
could also interpret a prohibition against the waiver of rights and remedies to include a ban on mandatory
arbitration. See Dugan, supra, at 252–53.
250. See Amanda Gomez, New Mexico Prohibits Non-Disclosure Provisions in Settlement
Agreements Involving Harassment and Discrimination Claims, NAT’L L. REV. (June 7, 2021), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/new-mexico-prohibits-non-disclosure-provisions-settlementagreements-involving [https://perma.cc/RX3X-55GM].
251. Id.
252. Id.
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statutes. 253 New Jersey, for example, prohibits employment contract
clauses that waive substantive or procedural rights and remedies when
a sexual discrimination or harassment claim is involved. 254 Vermont’s
law is very similar to New Jersey’s. 255 Washington’s law is also similar,
but it covers all forms of discrimination and focuses more specifically
on an “employee’s right to publicly pursue a cause of action.”256
Although Maryland does not explicitly prohibit confidentiality
provisions, it bans the waiver of rights or remedies in employment
contracts when an employee makes a sexual harassment claim. 257
Similarly, California bans contractual provisions that waive a
claimant’s right to testify about sexual harassment if they are later
legally required to disclose the confidential information (e.g. by a
subpoena). 258 California also prohibits employers from asking
employees not to disclose “unlawful acts in the workplace,” including
sexual harassment, in return for a raise or bonus. 259 The California
legislature attempted to broaden these prohibitions in a bill signed into
law by Governor Newsom in October 2019. 260 Although the proposed
law, Assembly Bill 51 (AB 51), does not explicitly ban mandatory
arbitration in employment disputes,261 it does prohibit employees from
waiving their rights to any forum or procedure as a condition of their
employment. 262 Thus, AB 51 effectively bans mandatory arbitration
clauses in employment contracts. 263
AB 51 was scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2020. 264 In
December 2019, however, the California Chamber of Commerce and
other trade organizations sought to enjoin AB 51’s enforcement on the
253. Chamber of Com. v. Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1087–89, 1090 (E.D. Cal. 2020), aff ’d in
part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Chamber of Com. v. Bonta, 13 F.4th 766 (9th Cir.
2021); Assemb. B. 51, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB51 [https://perma.cc/L25M-RYYM] (“Nothing in this
section is intended to invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is otherwise enforceable
under the Federal Arbitration Act.”).
254. N.J STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.7 (West 2021). However, this public policy exception does not
apply to collective bargaining agreements. Id. § 10:5-12.7(1)(c).
255. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h(g)(1)(B) (2021).
256. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.085 (2020).
257. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-715(a) (West 2018).
258. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.11 (West 2020).
259. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12964.5(a)(2) (West 2021).
260. Assemb. B. 51, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB51 [https://perma.cc/L25M-RYYM].
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. See Thomas H. Petrides & Harrison Thorne, Federal Court Preliminary Enjoins Enforcement of
New California Arbitration Law AB 51, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com
/article/federal-court-preliminary-enjoins-enforcement-new-california-arbitration-law-ab-51
[https://perma.cc/3NJ9-288Q].
264. Chamber of Com. v. Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1085 (E.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Chamber of Com. v. Bonta, 13 F.4th 766 (9th Cir. 2021).
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grounds that it is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 265 On
December 30, the federal district court granted a temporary restraining
order, preventing AB 51 from coming into operation as planned. 266 In
February 2020, the court released an order granting a preliminary
injunction. 267 The court held that AB 51 will likely be preempted by the
FAA because it treats agreements to arbitrate differently than other
agreements and conflicts with the FAA’s objectives. 268
The second category of states legislate against mandatory
arbitration agreements. 269 For example, Illinois not only prohibits
employers from requiring a waiver of substantive or procedural rights
as a term of employment, 270 but also goes a step further and voids any
clause that, as a term of employment, requires employees to arbitrate.271
Illinois includes an exception to this prohibition when both parties
provide “knowing . . . and bargained-for consideration,” however, the
employee may still report discrimination or seek legal advice. 272 In New
York a bill was proposed which would void contractual clauses that
waive rights and remedies relating to discrimination claims (including
harassment). 273 Although that bill has not passed, New York already
specifically prohibits the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses
for discrimination claims. 274
F. Preemption of State Laws Under the Federal Arbitration Act
Hope is on the horizon over the arbitration landscape, as discussed
below, but under existing law, it may not matter whether state laws
explicitly or implicitly prohibit mandatory arbitration. These laws may,
like California’s AB 51, be preempted under the FAA.275 In fact, a
Washington court has already ruled that the state’s mandatory
arbitration ban is unenforceable due to preemption. 276 In Logan v. Lithia
Motors, an employee and Lithia Motors agreed to arbitrate all

265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1100. The preliminary injunction will remain in force until a final judgment is issued
or an appeal is filed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Petrides & Thorne, supra note 263.
269. See Gomez, supra note 250.
270. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96/1-25(b) (2020).
271. Id.
272. Id. 96/1-25(c).
273. S.B. S6382A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1 (N.Y. 2017).
274. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515 (MCKINNEY 2019).
275. See Petrides & Thorne, supra note 263.
276. Washington State Takes on the Arbitration of Harassment and Discrimination Claims, OGLETREE
DEAKINS (Aug. 7, 2009), https://ogletree.com/insights/washington-state-takes-on-the-arbitrationof-harassment-and-discrimination-claims/ [https://perma.cc/WQN6-65BU].
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employment-related claims. 277 The employment contract specifically
referred to the FAA. 278 Following his employment, the employee sued
Lithia Motors for discrimination. 279 Lithia Motors argued that the
dispute should be submitted to mandatory arbitration, claiming the
FAA preempted Washington’s statute. 280 The court agreed with Lithia
Motors’ argument because “[f]ederal policy favors arbitration” under
the FAA. 281 Thus, Lithia succeeded in moving the dispute to arbitration
because the FAA preempted Washington’s ban of mandatory arbitration
clauses. 282
Similarly, a federal court recently ruled that New York’s ban on
mandatory arbitration is preempted by the FAA.283 In Latif v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., an employee sued his former employer for discrimination
and sexual misconduct. 284 The employer sought to compel mandatory
arbitration because the employee had signed an arbitration
agreement. 285 The agreement stated that it should be interpreted in
accordance with the FAA. 286 The court granted the employer’s motion to
compel arbitration, 287 stating that “[t]he FAA . . . is not easily displaced
by state law.”288 The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of the
FAA’s wording and Supreme Court decisions interpreting it
demonstrate a preference for arbitration agreements. 289 Because the
court found that New York’s law discriminated against arbitration
agreements, the court held it preempted by the FAA. 290
These recent cases, as well as the preliminary injunction against
California’s AB 51, demonstrate a trend toward FAA preemption of state
laws. Based on the facts of the above cases, however, one could argue
that state law could strike down an employment contract mandating
arbitration if the contract lacks a reference to the FAA. 291 The issue of
277. Order: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Motion to Compel Arb., Logan v.
Lithia of Seattle, Inc., No. 18-2-19068-1 SEA (Wash. King Cnty. Super. Ct. July 12, 2019).
278. Id. at 2–3.
279. Id. at 3.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 7 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–
25 (1983)).
282. Id. at 9.
283. Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 18-cv-11528, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107020 (S.D.N.Y.
June 26, 2019).
284. Id. at *3.
285. Id. at *1–2.
286. Id. at *2.
287. Id. at *11.
288. Id. at *6.
289. Id. at *10–11.
290. Id. at *9.
291. See Jaime Cole, Washington State Takes on the Arbitration of Harassment and Discrimination Claims,
NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/washington-state-takes-arbitrationharassment-and-discrimination-claims [https://perma.cc/H6GQ-DKJE] (arguing that employers should
review their arbitration agreements to make sure they mention the Federal Arbitration Act).
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whether a contract needs to include a reference to federal law to
preempt state law has not yet been litigated. Regardless, the FAA
continues to cast a long shadow over attempts to limit enforcement of
mandatory arbitration clauses. 292
Furthermore, recent cases such as Manhattan Cryobank, Inc. v.
Hensley do not challenge Latif’s holding that the FAA preempts state law
bans on mandatory arbitration in sexual harassment cases.293
Manhattan Cryobank distinguished Latif by contrasting minors’
arbitration claims with those of adults; it noted contractual differences
between the arbitration of adults’ workplace discrimination claims and
the arbitration of cases where children inherited genetic diseases from
dishonest sperm donors. 294 In contrast, Tantaros v. Fox News Network,
LLC295 casts some doubt on Latif, first by acknowledging the lack of
analysis from other federal courts regarding New York’s local statute
specifying prohibited types of mandatory arbitration clauses, 296 and
then by emphasizing the importance of federal jurisdiction in Latif:
The only other federal court case interpreting § 7515 is . . . Latif
v. Morgan Stanley & Co . . . in which Judge Cote held that § 7515
was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. In that case,
however, federal jurisdiction was clearly present given
Plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1981 federal claims. The Court and
Parties agreed that the issue of preemption was to be resolved
by the District Court in that case. 297
But neither case offers robust criticism of Latif or the FAA, and instead
indicate that the FAA continues to offer a viable means of preventing
state laws from restricting the use of mandatory arbitration provisions
in sexual harassment claims. 298
Fortunately, further judicial scrutiny of Latif or the FAA may be less
urgently needed now that the tangible effects of the #MeToo movement
have begun to materialize. In the wake of the movement, discussions in
Congress to amend the FAA led to proposals including the Forced
Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act (R.963), which would invalidate
292. See Triston O’Savio, Does FAA Prevent States from Barring Mandatory Arbitration?, CORP.
COUNS. BUS. J. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://ccbjournal.com/articles/does-faa-prevent-states-frombarring-mandatory-arbitration [https://perma.cc/6467-WY9W].
293. Manhattan Cryobank, Inc. v. Hensley, No. 19 Civ. 3370, 2020 WL 4605236 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
11, 2020).
294. Id. at *3–6.
295. Tantaros v. Fox News Network, LLC, 465 F. Supp. 3d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
296. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515 (MCKINNEY 2019).
297. Tantaros, F. Supp. 3d at 392 n.6.
298. See Keith J. Frank, State Legislation Precluding Compelled Arbitration in Sexual Harassment
Claims and the FAA, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
business_law/publications/blt/2020/03/compelled-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/7ZJC-CDB5].
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forced arbitration requirements in an employment, consumer,
antitrust or civil rights dispute, as well as the Protecting the Right to
Organize Act (PRO Act) (R.842, which could empower women to
collectively bargain against their employers and enforce their rights.299
As of this Article’s publication, Congress recently passed legislation,
which President Biden is expected to sign, banning forced arbitration
provisions in contracts involving sexual harassment and sexual assault
cases brought by workers and customers. 300 The law will apply to
employment contracts retroactively, 301 further bolstering protections
offered by the state laws discussed above.
G. Local Laws Regulating Sexual Misconduct
States are not the only entities attempting to address sexual
misconduct in the wake of the #MeToo movement—local governments
are attempting to do so as well. 302 For example, the “Stop Sexual
Harassment in NYC Act” became effective in 2018. 303 Aimed at fighting
workplace sexual harassment, this Act is a series of laws that expand
New York City’s sexual harassment protections, including mandatory
employee trainings and required notification of employees of their
rights. 304 Additionally, in San Francisco, local officials are prohibited
from entering into confidential settlement arrangements, 305 and every
city commissioner must complete yearly ethics and sexual harassment
training. 306

299. FAIR Act, H.R. 963, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/
house-bill/963/text [https://perma.cc/FH89-FSXC]; Protecting the Right to Organize Act of
2021, H.R. 842, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/842
[https://perma.cc/H4PE-JP2P]; Robert S. Whitman & John R. Phillips, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Turning
of the Tide: Could Congress Ban Mandatory Employment Arbitration?, LEXOLOGY: WAGE & HOUR LITIG.
BLOG (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9644173a-dac6-4a72-887aa82e1a4994a4 [https://perma.cc/3JBG-YDYR].
300. Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act, S. 2342, 117th
Cong. (2021).
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., Our Opinion: Society Is Poised to Change for the Better—If We Let It, PORTLAND TRIB.
(June 16, 2020), https://pamplinmedia.com/pt/10-opinion/470422-380576-our-opinion-society-ispoised-to-change-for-the-better-%C3%A2%E2%82%AC%E2%80%9C-if-we-let-it- [https://perma.cc
/9D9A-X7K6].
303. N.Y.C., ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-107(29)–(30) (2020).
304. Id.; Stop Sexual Harassment Act, N.Y.C. HUMAN RIGHTS, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cchr
/law/stop-sexual-harassment-act.page [https://perma.cc/4V8N-Q3MX].
305. See S.F. ADMIN. CODE art. 2, § 67.12(b)(3) (2020), https://sfgov.org/sunshine/article-iipublic-access-meetings#67_12 [https://perma.cc/M3VM-QHH9] (“[A] policy body shall neither
solicit nor agree to any term in a settlement which would preclude the release of the text of the
settlement itself and any related documentation.”).
306. Dennis J. Herrera, GOOD GOVERNMENT GUIDE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAWS GOVERNING THE
CONDUCT OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 11 (2018) (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12950.1, 53235 (West 2021)),
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These local laws strive to remedy the insufficient legal protections,
brought to light by the #MeToo movement, which have left employees
vulnerable to workplace sexual harassment. 307 By implementing
legislation targeted at preventing sexual harassment as well as
providing measures to support the legal rights of claimants, these
localities seek to transform workplace culture, expand protections to all
employees, and increase employer accountability. 308 Whether New York
City and San Francisco inspire other local governments to pass similar
laws remains to be seen. The next Part highlights how attitudes and
advocacy around women’s rights have shifted as a result of greater
societal turmoil and transformation.
IV. INFLECTION POINTS AND CHANGE
A. Inflection Points
2020–2021 has been a time of inflection. 309 Prior inflection points
include 1933, the year that the Great Depression reached its peak, and
the beginning of the Civil War in 1861. 310 These times usually result from
a confluence of events causing a significant societal shift that leads to
changes not only in attitudes, but also in laws and in people holding
positions of power. 311 A more recent confluence occurred in 1979 when
an energy crisis, the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran,
stagflation, and economic turmoil prompted the conservative shift and

https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Good-Gvt-Guide-3.20.2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MZ9D-EB9N]).
307. See Blythe E. Lovinger & Jonathan A. Wexler, New York State and City Pass Sweeping Anti-Sexual
Harassment Laws Amid #MeToo, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/newyork-state-and-city-pass-sweeping-anti-sexual-harassment-laws-amid-metoo [https://perma.cc/PL9BMQWV].
308. See Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, N.Y.C. HUM. RTS., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cchr/
media/sexual-harassment-campaign.page [https://perma.cc/53V3-6RVK]; Yuki Noguchi & Shane
McKeon, Amid #MeToo, New York Employers Face Strict New Sexual Harassment Laws, NPR (Oct. 9, 2018,
4:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/09/654537942/amid-metoo-new-york-employers-face-strictnew-sexual-harassment-laws [https://perma.cc/7SVN-LFSY].
309. In the United States, turning points in national life tend to be defined by the year. Gerald
F. Seib. Turning-Point Year Heads to Parts Unknown, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2020, at A4.
310. See History.com Editors, Great Depression History, HIST., https://www.history.com/
topics/great-depression/great-depression-history [https://perma.cc/TU6P-K5RZ]; History.com
Editors, Civil War, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war/american-civilwar-history [https://perma.cc/YR7W-HNJS].
311. See Tom Rosentiel, How a Different America Responded to the Great Depression, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Dec. 14, 2010), https://www.pewresearch.org/2010/12/14/how-a-different-americaresponded-to-the-great-depression/ [https://perma.cc/D7NX-XSEY].
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subsequent election of Ronald Reagan. 312 Another inflection period
occurred in 1968, 313 when protests followed the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. and a racial divide was intensified by the
campaign of George Wallace, a racist and populist presidential
candidate. 314 The assassination of presidential candidate Robert F.
Kennedy further shocked the country, which was already deeply divided
over the Vietnam War. 315 This generational and class rift was amplified
by the chaos at the Democratic political convention in Chicago. 316
We appear to be suffering from a similarly divisive time in 2020 and
2021. 317 At the time of this Article’s publication, the COVID-19 pandemic
has resulted in the deaths of over 950,000 Americans, where people of
color are disproportionately represented in this statistic. 318 As a
consequence of the pandemic and the resulting shutdowns, the country
plunged into an economic crisis characterized by widespread
unemployment and an unexpectedly steep decline in the employmentto-population ratio. 319 This, in turn, has led to shifts in the way people
work, 320 are schooled, 321 and interact. 322 The pandemic also brought to
312. Anna Bauman & Jane Clayson, Tracing the Path of the Modern GOP, from Reagan to Trump,
WBUR (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2020/08/28/gerald-seib-tracing-moderngop [https://perma.cc/D35M-WYPZ].
313. See Kenneth T. Walsh, 1968: The Year That Changed America Forever, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 31,
2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-12-31/1968-the-yearthat-changed-america-forever [https://perma.cc/33XX-XKMA].
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. William A. Galston, I’ve Never Been so Afraid for America, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2020, at A17.
317. One might think that an appropriate historical comparison would be the influenza
outbreak of 1918. Although that pandemic caused worldwide death and disruption, it was also
followed by the end of WWI and an economic upturn. Elizabeth Yuko, How World War I’s Legacy
Eclipsed the 1918 Pandemic, HISTORY (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.history.com/news/world-war-i1918-pandemic-memorials [https://perma.cc/HH8W-JMZC] (noting that WWI concluded nine
months following the start of the pandemic); Elliot Smith, ‘Roaring 20s’ After the Pandemic? Big Banks
Warn Be Careful What You Wish For, CNBC (Jan. 27, 2021, 1:44 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/
27/roaring-20s-after-the-pandemic-big-banks-warn-be-careful-what-you-wish-for.html [https://
perma.cc/TGE8-3MU9] (explaining that the Roaring 20s followed the pandemic). Some lessons
were learned about how to deal with such an outbreak, and it caused a change in thinking in the
medical profession, but it is hard to separate the pandemic and the war. See JOHN M. BARRY, THE
GREAT INFLUENZA (2005).
318. Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2021/us/covid-cases.html [https://perma.cc/64PS-K47E]; Risk for COVID-19 Infection,
Hospitalization, and Death by Race/Ethnicity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-discovery/hospitalization-deathby-race-ethnicity.html [https://perma.cc/5YFW-AUDC].
319. Heather Gillers & Gunjan Banerji, U.S. States Face Biggest Cash Crisis Since the Great
Depression, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2020, at A1; Victoria Udalova, Pandemic Impact on Mortality and
Economy Varies Across Age Groups and Geographies, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 8, 2021), https://
www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/03/initial-impact-covid-19-on-united-states-economy-morewidespread-than-on-mortality.html [https://perma.cc/5LL3-AAXF].
320. See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, Upsides for Some Remote Workers; Lost Pay and Security for Others,
N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/26/business/economy/laborremote-work-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/F8XD-BTZY].
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light the inequities in our healthcare system 323 and disparities in
wages. 324 The killings of George Floyd 325 and Breonna Taylor 326 by police
spurred nationwide protests against the pervasive discriminatory
policing suffered by Black Americans. The Black Lives Matter
movement continues to call for change, highlighting racial inequities
not only in policing, but also in all facets of American life. 327 Political
divisions have deepened, furthered by an impeachment trial 328 and an
unusually bitter political campaign, followed by violent insurrection at
the United States Capitol. 329 At the same time, unprecedented fires,
floods, and storms have caused even further harm, 330 with devastating
effects. 331

321. See, e.g., Erin Richards, Students Are Falling Behind in Online School. Where’s the COVID-19
‘Disaster Plan’ to Catch Them up?, USA TODAY (Dec. 17, 2020, 1:33 PM), https://www.usatoday.com
/indepth/news/education/2020/12/13/covid-online-school-tutoring-plan/6334907002/
[https://
perma.cc/NQ43-EGG3].
322. See, e.g., Joe Pinsker, The Art of Socializing During a Quarantine, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-quarantine-socializing/608020
/ [https://perma.cc/SH6Y-KEX9].
323. See Meera Jagannathan, Telemedicine Provides People with a Lifeline During the Pandemic—for
Wealthier Americans, MARKETWATCH (Jan 6, 2021), https://www.marketwatch.com/amp/story/thesevulnerable-populations-had-trouble-accessing-telemedicine-during-the-pandemic-and-that-couldworsen-existing-inequities-11609884738 [https://perma.cc/QK79-8PAD]; Isaac Stanley-Becker & Lena
H. Sun, Covid-19 is Devastating Communities of Color. Can Vaccines Counter Racial Inequity?, WASH. POST
(Dec. 18, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/12/18/covid-vaccine-racialequity/ [https://perma.cc/X2XX-9PE8].
324. See, e.g., Katy O’Donnell & Janaki Chadha, The Most Lopsided Economic Event Imaginable: Wave of
Evictions Threatens Black, Latino Tenants, POLITICO (Dec. 15, 2020, 11:05 AM), https://www.politico.com
/states/new-york/albany/story/2020/12/14/the-most-lopsided-economic-event-imaginable-wave-ofevictions-threatens-black-latino-tenants-1346648 [https://perma.cc/NT7F-SRLZ]; Alicia Adamczyk,
Inequity Has Been Building for Decades in the U.S., but Experts Say the Pandemic ‘Ripped It Open,’ CNBC (Oct.
23, 2020 2:07 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/23/coronavirus-is-exacerbating-economicinequality-in-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/B3C7-T9UT].
325. N.Y. Times Staff, What We Know About the Death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, SEATTLE
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2020, 3:31 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/what-we-knowabout-the-death-of-george-floyd-in-minneapolis/ [https://perma.cc/ZDE5-ZPCW].
326. Richard Oppel, Jr., Derrick Bryson Taylor & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, What to Know
About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article
/breonna-taylor-police.html [https://perma.cc/384F-G64J].
327. See Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest
Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07
/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/GM2S-QWKL].
328. Seung Min Kim, In Historic Vote, Trump Acquitted of Impeachment Charges, WASH. POST
(Feb.
5,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-historic-vote-trump-acquitted-ofimpeachment-charges/2020/02/05/8b7ea90e-4832-11ea-ab15-b5df3261b710_story.html
[https://
perma.cc/5YUF-E4V4].
329. See Bill Duryea, An Unprecedented Election—and Its Bitter Aftermath—Seen from Across the
Country, POLITICO MAG. (Nov. 15, 2020, 11:45 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/
11/15/american-voices-roundup-435702 [https://perma.cc/G4QP-HQGJ].
330. See e.g., Bob Henson, Iowa Derecho Was Likely Costliest U.S. Thunderstorm, SEATTLE TIMES
(Oct. 17, 2020, 12:26 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/iowa-derecho-in-augustwas-most-costly-thunderstorm-disaster-in-u-s-history/ [https://perma.cc/U7XF-VHRN] (“No
single thunderstorm event in modern times—not even a tornado—has wrought as much economic
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Inflection points may lead to shifts in societal thinking and calls for
reform in the government and its laws. 332 Indeed, according to one
influential scholar of constitutional theory, inflection points can be
direct causes of constitutional change. 333 Major societal-paradigm shifts
can, according to Bruce Ackerman, themselves become an instance of
“higher lawmaking,” through which “We the People” can effect
constitutional change without undergoing the formal amendment
process. 334 According to Ackerman, major inflection points have caused
three constitutional paradigm shifts: from the Founding paradigm,
through Reconstruction, to the current New Deal Constitutionalism.335
Inflection points can cause radical changes in our constitutional
thought—even without formal amendments—that can respond to and
even exacerbate interbranch conflict. 336 National crises cause
interbranch conflict (as, e.g., between the Supreme Court and the
Executive) that is eventually resolved by a series of decisive elections.337
As the nation is faced with a confluence of social crises, a pandemic,
and sharp division between an ultra-conservative judiciary and an
increasingly liberal population (and, with President Biden’s election, a
liberal Executive), we may well be heading toward another
constitutional paradigm shift, particularly given the Democrats’
expressed willingness to consider court reform. 338
But even if we reject Ackerman’s views, it is clear that social crises
often serve as catalysts for legal change. 339 Consider, for example, when
recognition of entrenched gender and racial inequities became

devastation as the derecho that slammed the nation’s Corn Belt.”); Arian Campo-Flores, Hurricane
Zeta Makes Landfall in Southeastern Louisiana as 27th Named Storm of Season, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29,
2020, 6:38 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hurricane-zeta-strengthens-as-it-churns-towardlouisiana-11603891153 [https://perma.cc/R8ND-4PRN] (reporting that Hurricane Zeta is the
twenty-seventh of the season, almost reaching the record of twenty-eight in 2005).
331. See Umair Irfan, Fires, Floods, Hurricanes, and Locusts: 2020 Was an Epic Year for Disasters,
VOX (Dec. 30, 2020, 1:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/22202889/disasters-2020-flood-hurricanewildfire-australia-california-covid-pandemic [https://perma.cc/C7JM-SR6T].
332. See e.g., Heather E. McGowan, The Coronavirus Is Creating an Inflection Point in the Future of
Work, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2020, 7:46 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/heathermcgowan/2020/
04/16/the-coronavirus-is-creating-an-inflection-point-in-the-future-ofwork/?sh=79e5e0183b2d [https://perma.cc/5KWD-6A79].
333. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993).
334. Id. at 6–7.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. For a more detailed description of Ackerman’s view of this process, see id.; see also BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000).
338. See We the People Podcast, 2020: A Constitutional Year in Review, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Dec. 24,
2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/podcast/a-constitutional-year-in-review
[https://perma.cc/X5US-K666].
339. See Annegret Haase, Covid-19 as a Social Crisis and Justice Challenge for Cities, FRONTIERS
IN SOCIO. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2020.583638/full
[https://perma.cc/Y4GL-VHJB].
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widespread in the 1960s, leading to the passage of the Equal Pay Act of
1963 340 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which includes Title VII. 341 Today,
in response to growing acknowledgement of racial, gender, and
economic inequalities stemming from the events of 2020, women have
gained significant power in Congress and state legislatures. 342
Moreover, the #MeToo movement has prompted greater awareness of
injustices in the corporate world. 343 Academics have acknowledged that
the #MeToo movement “has strong support in Congress, in state
legislatures, and in the business community.” 344 In light of the
movement, companies and shareholders are rethinking their approach
to diversity, equal treatment, and leadership. 345 These factors suggest
that new legislation and regulations designed to level the playing field
and end sexual harassment in the workplace are likely.
This societal shift coincides with the election of President Biden,
Vice President Kamala Harris, and a more balanced Congress.346
Liberals have been a driving force behind the #MeToo movement,
making them more likely to respond to sexual harassment with political
change. 347 In his first speech as President-Elect, while laying out his
goals for the coming four years, Biden noted that we were at an
inflection point. 348 He cited the need to address inequities so that

340. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). At the time, women earning less than men for the same job was
viewed as the primary inequality facing women, and the Equal Pay Act was designed to fix that. See
Bettina C.K. Binder, Terry Morehead Dworkin, Niculina Nae, Cindy A. Schipani & Irina
Averianova, The Plight of Women in Positions of Corporate Leadership in the United States, the European
Union, and Japan: Differing Laws and Cultures, Similar Issues, 26 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 279, 302 (2020).
341. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
342. See Rachel Zohn, Nevada Continues to Lead State Legislatures on Women’s Equality Day, U.S.
NEWS (Aug. 26, 2020, 4:56 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2020-0826/women-seek-legislative-office-in-record-numbers-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/89AQ-JNVT].
343. See Cindy A. Schipani & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The Need for Mentors in Promoting Diverse
Leadership in the #MeToo Era, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1272, 1280–81 (2019).
344. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Me, Too and #MeToo: Women in Congress and the Boardroom, 87
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1079, 1088 (2019) (quoting Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Epic
Backslide: The Supreme Court Endorses Mandatory Individual Arbitration Agreements, #TimesUp on
Workers’ Rights, 15 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 41, 81 (2019)).
345. See id. at 1089.
346. See Alex Clark, Dominic Gilbert, Richard Moynihan & Bruno Riddy, US Election Results and
Maps 2020: Joe Biden Wins US Election After Victory in Pennsylvania; Win in the State of Pennsylvania
Cements Victory for Biden-See the US Election 2020 Results in Full, TELEGRAPH ONLINE (Nov. 13, 2020),
https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=STND&u=umuser&id=GALE%7CA641398065&v=2.1&it=r&sid=sum
mon [https://perma.cc/L55D-7JFE].
347. See Claire Gothreau, 2020 Is the First Presidential Election of the #MeToo Era. Why Do the
Political Parties See It so Differently?, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POL. (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://cawp.rutgers.edu/election-analysis/2020-first-presidential-election-metoo-era-why-dopolitical-parties-see-it-so [https://perma.cc/NR8A-E89A].
348. Camila Domonoske & Barbara Sprunt, Hope, Healing, and ‘Better Angels’: Biden Declares
Victory and Vows Unity, NPR (Nov. 7, 2020, 3:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates2020-election-results/2020/11/07/932104693/biden-to-make-victory-speech-as-president-elect-at8-p-m-et [https://perma.cc/JN5H-9MKP].
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people would have a “fair chance” to achieve what they wanted and
needed in our society. 349
President Biden’s “fair chance” resembles the goals of the civil
rights movement and resultant Civil Rights Act of 1964: to provide an
equal playing field. 350 The country is likely ready for a new civil rights
push. If a new Civil Rights Act were to be enacted, the next question
becomes: what should be its focus? At its heart, it must address racial,
gender, and economic inequality. Especially considering the
disproportionate effect of COVID-19 on people of color and women, the
need for intersectional change is clear. 351 The pandemic again exposed
that Americans were not truly all in this together. Black women lost
their jobs at the highest rate of all other groups during the pandemic
while also facing more severe threats to their health from COVID-19
given the disproportionate incidence of chronic health conditions
among the Black female population. 352 Because both COVID-19 and the
Black Lives Matter movement are intersectional issues uniquely
impacting women, lifting up women—such as in the workplace—will
aid in the progress of these and other movements addressing this
country’s entrenched inequities. 353 Many of today’s circumstances are
different from those existing when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
passed, thus the solutions will be different. But the goal is the same: a
fairer society for the benefit of all.
B. Congressional Action
This better society can be achieved through several possible
approaches. Earlier in this Article, we cite Professor Paul Freund of
Harvard University for his commentary on the debate over passage of
the ERA. 354 He analogized the two approaches to the issue of equal
rights for women—the ERA versus other solutions—as a “single broadspectrum drug with uncertain and unwanted side-effects and a

349. Id.
350. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Long Struggle for Freedom, LIB. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/
exhibits/civil-rights-act/civil-rights-act-of-1964.html [https://perma.cc/VDF4-TGL2].
351. See Lisa Bowleg, We’re Not All in This Together: On COVID-19, Intersectionality, and Structural
Inequality, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 917 (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC7287552/ [https://perma.cc/7L3A-HAHF].
352. Tim Smart, COVID-19 Job Market Wreaks Havoc on Black Women, U.S.NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 15,
2021, 1:40 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2021-04-15/black-women-sufferingthe-most-from-covid-19-job-market-disruption [https://perma.cc/F4AY-SMMJ].
353. See Bowleg, supra note 351; Smart, supra note 352; Marcia Chatelain & Kaavya Asoka,
Women and Black Lives Matter: An Interview with Marcia Chatelain, DISSENT MAG. (Summer 2015),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/women-black-lives-matter-interview-marcia-chatelain
[http://perma.cc/B3SN-F3S3].
354. See Freund, supra note 47, at 234–35.
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selection of specific pills for specific ills.” 355 Because of today’s political
climate, this Article urges for specific pills in the short term while
considering the ERA as a “broad spectrum,” longer-term goal.
President Biden faced many challenges upon entering office, but
his overarching objectives have been reviving the economy and
controlling COVID-19, which in turn would also help rebuild the
economy.356 Before COVID-19, slow progress was made in expanding
the representation of women in the workplace, from entry level jobs to
C-suite positions. But COVID-19 brought with it major setbacks.357
Before the pandemic, women did not opt out of the workforce at a
higher rate than men, yet during the pandemic women were pushed out
of the workplace at a far higher rate. 358 If the “negative impact of
COVID-19 on women remains unaddressed—global GDP in 2030 would
be $1 trillion below where it would have been if COVID-19 had affected
men and women equally.” 359 To make economic gains, the jobs market
must be revitalized. 360 And for this to occur, women must be brought
back into the workforce. 361 As of this Article’s publication, one of
President Biden’s proposed domestic policy initiatives is a $1.9 trillion
relief plan to support families with childcare and necessary costs.362
Childcare aid will allow parents, especially mothers, to return to the
workforce. 363
The pandemic has imposed a far greater toll on women’s
employment than on men’s. 364 For example, in September 2020,
865,000 women were laid off or had left the workforce compared to

355. Id. at 235.
356. See The Biden Emergency Action Plan to Save the Economy, BIDEN HARRIS DEMOCRATS,
https://joebiden.com/the-biden-emergency-action-plan-to-save-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/
94GU-32VT].
357. Seven Charts That Show COVID-19’s Impact on Women’s Employment, MCKINSEY & CO. (Mar.
8, 2021), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-inclusion/seven-charts-thatshow-covid-19s-impact-on-womens-employment [https://perma.cc/4GB2-A28V].
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See Lucia Mutikani, U.S. Labor Market Roars Back; Full Recovery Still Years Away, REUTERS
(Mar. 5, 2021, 12:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economy/u-s-labor-marketroars-back-full-recovery-still-years-away-idUSKBN2AX0CY [https://perma.cc/6SZE-SS3B].
361. See Michel Martin, Getting Women back to Work Is Key to a Strong Recovery, Labor Secretary
Says, NPR (May 8, 2021, 8:37 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/
05/08/995065486/getting-women-back-to-work-is-key-to-a-strong-recovery-labor-secretary-says
[https://perma.cc/UK69-CJSY].
362. Jeff Stein, Child Cash Benefit Will Begin Hitting Millions of Parents’ Bank Accounts July 15,
WASH. POST (May 17, 2021, 1:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/05/17
/biden-child-tax-benefit/ [https://perma.cc/2SFG-6KHR].
363. See id.
364. See Pallavi Gogoi, Stuck-at-Home Moms: The Pandemic’s Devastating Toll on Women, NPR
(Oct. 28, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/28/928253674/stuck-at-home-moms-thepandemics-devastating-toll-on-women [https://perma.cc/4HQL-43GJ].
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216,000 men. 365 In December 2020, all jobs lost were those held by
women. 366 As of May 2021, only 56% of women were working for pay, the
lowest number since 1986. 367 Women of color have been particularly
impacted. Total employment for Black women in February 2021 was
down 9.7% from February 2020; that figure was 8.6% for Hispanic
women. 368 For white women, total employment was down 5.4%. 369 The
difference is stark in employment-to-population ratios as well. In
February 2020, before the pandemic, Black women’s employment-topopulation ratio was 60.8%; as of April 2021, it stands at 54.8%, a sixpercentage point drop. 370 By contrast, white women’s rate dropped by
only about three percentage points. 371 These differences stem in part
from the pandemic’s disproportionate impact on sectors like retail,
tourism, and state and local governments, all of which employ large
numbers of Black women and all of which were negatively impacted by
COVID. 372
The pandemic may also drive many women to quit their jobs. The
Sixth Annual Women in the Workplace Study by McKinsey & Co. and
LeanIn.org found that more than a quarter of women said they may
resign due to pandemic pressures, and more than thirty percent at the
management level felt similarly. 373 Women are feeling pushed to a point
that is unsustainable. 374 Inequality long predates the pandemic,
especially in access to leadership positions, and the onset of the
pandemic has only intensified the divide. 375 Moreover, women who feel
365. Katie Surma, Recession Disproportionately Affects Women as More Moms Are Forced to Quit Jobs,
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020, 2:03 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/pandemicrecession-disproportionately-affects-women-as-more-working-moms-are-forced-to-quit-jobs/
[https://perma.cc/CF72-AF8T]. Some have called this a “shecession.” Id.
366. Annalyn Kurtz, The US Economy Lost 140,000 Jobs in December. All of Them Were Held by
Women, CNN (Jan. 8, 2021, 9:25 PM), http://cnn.com/2021/01/08/economy/women-job-lossespandemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/EJY5-CZU4]. At the same time, men gained 16,000 jobs.
Id.
367. Claire Cain Miller, The Pandemic Created a Child-Care Crisis. Mothers Bore the Burden, N.Y.
TIMES (May 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/05/17/upshot/women-workforceemployment-covid.html [https://perma.cc/572R-D8UM].
368. Nate Rattner & Thomas Franck, Black and Hispanic Women Aren’t Sharing in the Job Market
Recovery, CNBC (Mar. 5, 2021, 2:09 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/05/black-and-hispanicwomen-arent-sharing-in-the-job-market-recovery.html [https://perma.cc/M5AK-FMYR].
369. Id.
370. Smart, supra note 352.
371. Id.
372. See id.
373. See Sarah Coury, Jess Huang, Ankur Kumar, Sara Prince, Alexis Krivkovich & Lareina Yee,
Women in the Workplace 2020, MCKINSEY & CO. (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/featuredinsights/diversity-and-inclusion/women-in-the-workplace [https://perma.cc/RK76-7PRX].
374. Id.
375. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of Gender Diversity in Corporate
Governance, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 105, 140 (2018); Maria Minor, COVID-19’s Impact on Gender Inequality in the
Workforce Doesn’t Have to Be a Step Backwards. Here’s Why, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2020, 6:50 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mariaminor/2020/11/02/covid-19s-impact-on-gender-inequality-in-the-
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forced to leave work, even temporarily, can lose job skills, opportunities
for advancement, wages, and benefits. 376 This outflow of female
workers may reverse the last five years of progress that women have
made toward increasing their representation across all segments of the
workforce. 377 Companies attempting to diversify are also losing out.378
Two actions can help women reenter the workforce: improved childcare
and higher wages. 379
In the post-election political climate, concrete steps seem feasible.
Vice President Kamala Harris has long fought for civil rights and
women’s rights. 380 And there are more women in positions of power in
Washington, D.C. than ever before. 381 Women gained valuable seats in
the House, the number of female Republican House members doubling
from nine to eighteen. 382 Women who held several top posts in the
Biden campaign have filled important positions in his administration,
and Biden has picked eleven women to serve on his cabinet. 383
Biden tapped two women—his campaign manager and his
campaign’s general counsel—to be his deputy chief of staff and counsel

workforce-doesnt-have-to-be-a-step-backwards-heres-why/?sh=38fc4c7943c8 [https://perma.cc/YLT79L8P].
376. See Dworkin & Schipani, supra note 375, at 122.
377. See Kevin Sneader & Laureina Yee, As Women Fight to Maintain Progress, Companies Must
Reimagine How They Operate, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/aswomen-fight-to-maintain-progress-companies-need-to-reimagine-how-they-operate-11601434152
[https://perma.cc/74ZB-AAWQ]; Lauren Weber & Vanessa Fuhrmans, How the Coronavirus Crisis
Threatens to Set Back Women’s Careers, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/how-the-coronavirus-crisis-threatens-to-set-back-womens-careers-11601438460 [https://
perma.cc/PYW2-3UMK].
378. Even in the midst of the pandemic, Nasdaq, Inc. filed a proposal with the Securities and
Exchange Commission that would require the almost 3,000 companies listed on its exchange to
have at least one female on their board or else disclose why they are not meeting the requirement.
Jack Kelly, New Policy Requires Diversity on Corporate Boards for Nasdaq-Listed Companies, FORBES (Aug.
11, 2021, 8:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2021/08/11/new-policy-requiresdiversity-on-corporate-boards-for-nasdaq-listed-companies/?sh=36400b011abe. Additionally, they
must have one racial minority or LGBTQ+ board member. Id. The New York Stock Exchange has
taken a less aggressive approach, by establishing an advisory council to assist companies on its
exchange in identifying diverse candidates for boards. Alexander Osipovich & Akane Otani, Stocks:
Nasdaq Pushes Diversity Rule, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2020, at A1.
379. See, e.g., Kweilin Ellingrud & Liz Hilton Segel, COVID-19 Has Driven Millions of Women out of the
Workforce. Here’s How to Help Them Come Back, FORTUNE (Feb. 13, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://fortune.com/
2021/02/13/covid-19-women-workforce-unemployment-gender-gap-recovery/ [https://perma.cc/
B6TV-4P99].
380. See Lisa Lerer & Sydney Ember, Historic Milestone for Woman Steeped in Civil Rights Battles,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2020, at A1.
381. Gabriel T. Rubin, Black, Female Candidates for Federal Office Reach Record High, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 23, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/black-female-candidates-for-federaloffice-reach-record-high-11603445402 [https://perma.cc/7JEL-65KX].
382. See Gerald F. Seib, The Year of the Women Really, Finally Did Arrive in 2020, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
16, 2020, 10:20 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-year-of-the-woman-really-finally-didarrive-in-2020-11605539331 [https://perma.cc/3ZSG-4572].
383. Who Are Joe Biden’s Cabinet Picks? The Full List, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2021, at A6.

406

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:2

to the president, respectively. 384 Biden’s appointments of women in the
economic realm point to a “focus on workers and income equality.” 385
Moreover, women tend to perform at higher levels within agencies and
organizations that actively support women. 386 President Biden has
placed numerous women in positions of leadership, and this decision
could contribute to more effective and proactive governance when it
comes to issues that disproportionately affect women.387
Access to childcare might be seen as a new form of civil right to the
extent that it gives children safety and consistency while allowing
parents equal access to work and a fair chance at success. 388 It will be
crucial not only to revitalizing the economy, but also to creating an
economy where every individual has “a fair shot and an equal chance to
get ahead.” 389 A major concern with respect to childcare access is that
“women’s waning labor force participation during the pandemic . . . [is]
the burden borne by mothers forced to choose between work and the
supervision and education of their young children.” 390 Government
action prioritizing and supporting childcare providers and parents may
allow parents, disproportionately mothers, to return to work.391
President Biden already cited increased tax breaks for childcare
expenses in his first economic plan upon being sworn in.392

384. Sean Sullivan, Biden Chooses More Key Members of White House Team, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
18, 2020, at A4. Biden’s former deputy campaign manager will become director of the White House
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs. Id.
385. Jim Tankersly, Jeanna Smialek & Alan Rappeport, Biden’s Economic Picks Suggest Focus on
Workers, Income Equality, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 30, 2020, 10:53 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/
11/30/nation/bidens-economic-picks-suggest-focus-workers-income-equality/ [https://perma.cc
/PLX8-ZLFB].
386. See INT’L LAB. ORG., EMPOWERING WOMEN AT WORK: COMPANY POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR
GENDER EQUALITY 18 tbl.2 (2020); see also Shelley Zalis, Power of the Pack: Women Who Support Women Are More
Successful, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2016, 10:43 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/shelleyzalis/2019/03/06/powerof-the-pack-women-who-support-women-are-more-successful/?sh=23c1973e1771 [https://perma.cc/
MX3R-E426].
387. See Rachel Augustine Potter & Craig Volden, How Women Leaders Can Enhance Rulemaking in the
Biden Administration, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/howwomen-leaders-can-enhance-rulemaking-in-the-biden-administration/ [https://perma.cc/94UJGKYB]; see also Tankersly, et al., supra note 385.
388. See Sarah Jane Glynn, Jane Farrell & Nancy Wu, The Importance of Preschool and Child Care for
Working Mothers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 8, 2013, 8:59 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/education-k-12/reports/2013/05/08/62519/the-importance-of-preschool-and-child-care-forworking-mothers/ [https://perma.cc/89FU-64QE] (noting how the availability of childcare can
profoundly help working mothers).
389. Id.
390. Martha C. White, Biden’s Newly Signed Rescue Plan Will Help Get Parents Back to Work—By
Supporting Child Care, NBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2021, 3:10 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/
economy/stimulus-bill-contains-billions-shore-daycare-centers-parents-child-care-n1260697
[https://perma.cc/Q6EP-57NX].
391. See id.
392. Richard Rubin & Eliza Collins, Biden Pursues $1.9 Trillion in Pandemic, Economic Relief, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 15, 2021, at A1.
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Additionally, the President has supported a “$15 billion allocation for
child development block grants, a $1 billion allocation for the Head Start
early education program, and a $24 billion stabilization fund for child
care providers” in order to support the infrastructure allowing parents
to return to work. 393 Many other developed countries provide
childcare; 394 Scandinavian countries and France are prime examples.395
Considering these examples, much could be achieved in the United
States through a combination of early preschool and supplements for
childcare. 396
A program supporting parents through additional access and
affordability of childcare could be funded similarly to Medicaid, with
joint federal and state contributions. The program could even be
expanded to include the private sector, such as by providing increased
tax breaks for companies that offer childcare. But a program like this
may be viewed by some as approaching the path of social welfare, and
with Congress so closely split, such a reform would likely be difficult to
achieve despite the obvious benefits for economic recovery.
Higher wages will also aid in women’s reentry into the workforce.
Lower wages perpetuate gender inequality and decrease women’s
independence. 397 Alleviating the wage gap will not only benefit the
economy, but also allow women to more easily return to work.
Additionally, closing the wage gap “benefits women’s families,
especially their children, by increasing investment in education, health,
nutrition, and housing.” 398
President Biden has already taken steps in this direction, including
through a minimum wage of $15 per hour proposed in his economic
relief package. 399 Although the $15 minimum wage ultimately did not

393. White, supra note 390.
394. See Sara Mead, Child Care Laggard, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 23, 2017, 11:05 AM), https://
www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/articles/2017-02-23/the-us-is-a-laggard-on-childcare [https://perma.cc/7B63-C64C].
395. See BARNARDOS & START STRONG, TOWARDS A SCANDINAVIAN CHILDCARE SYSTEM FOR 0-12 YEAR
OLDS IN IRELAND? (2012), https://www.childrensrights.ie/sites/default/files/submissions_reports/files/
Barnardos_-_Start_Strong_-_Childcare_Briefing_Paper_final_version.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRW9GUGJ]; Explorer Publishing, Childcare in France, EXPATICA (June 15, 2021), https://www.expatica.com/
fr/living/family/childcare-in-france-106409 [https://perma.cc/S2C3-M3NA].
396. See Mead, supra note 394.
397. Megan O’Donnell, Ugonma Nwankwo, Ania Calderon & Callie Strickland, Closing Gender
Pay Gaps: Identifying Roles for Government and the Private Sector, CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV. (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/closing-gender-pay-gaps-idenfitying-roles-for-governmentand-private-sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM57-MEHP].
398. Id.
399. See Rubin & Collins, supra note 392; Jim Tankersley & Michael D. Shear, Biden Seeks to
Define His Presidency by an Early Emphasis on Equity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/01/23/business/biden-equity-racial-gender.html [https://perma.cc/3JY7GQ8L].
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make it into the economic relief package, 400 this proposal is a valuable
jumping-off point for future lawmakers. This legislation would benefit
women and minorities, who have been pushed out of the workforce and
tend to have lower paying jobs than their white male counterparts.401
Correcting the wage gap would help women quickly reenter the
workforce and alleviate some of the burdens imposed by childcare and
eldercare expenses. 402 Numerous states have already committed to
increasing the minimum wage, with several raising it to $15 per hour.403
Even a lower increase would still constitute a step in the right
direction. 404
Additionally, other congressional measures may be used to further
address women’s inequality in the workplace. Congress has already
passed legislation barring employers from requiring employees to agree
to arbitration in most sexual harassment and sexual assault cases,
legislation which President Biden is expected to sign. The ability to
pursue discrimination claims furthers the public policy of rooting out
discrimination by allowing these claims to become public knowledge.
By contrast, there is no public reporting of arbitration claims,
permitting workplace discrimination to persist unnoticed.
As discussed above, another possible path is to ratify the 1970s
Equal Rights Amendment. 405 But given its current makeup, the
Supreme Court is unlikely to address the issue. 406 The addition of Amy
Coney Barrett to the Court in October 2020 means that a majority of the
Court are strict constructionists. 407 Strict constructionists generally
share the view that the Court’s role is to enforce statutes strictly as
400. Elisabeth Buchwald, $15 Minimum Wage Won’t Make It into Biden’s $1.9-Trillion COVID-19
Relief Bill—Lawmakers Have Other Ideas, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 1, 2021, 9:35 AM), https://
www.marketwatch.com/story/15-minimum-wage-wont-make-it-into-bidens-1-9-trillion-covidrelief-package-but-lawmakers-have-other-options-11614299275 [https://perma.cc/5YG8-L8ZL].
401. See Tankersley & Shear, supra note 399.
402. See Alyssa Davis & Elise Gould, Closing the Pay Gap and Beyond, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 18,
2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/closing-the-pay-gap-and-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/VGV7NALC].
403. Minimum Wage Tracker, ECON. POL’Y INST., https://www.epi.org/minimum-wage-tracker
/#/min_wage/Massachusetts [https://perma.cc/YV2U-4NLQ].
404. Cf. Carl Gibson, Commentary, Why U.S. Workers Need a $25 Per Hour Minimum Wage,
BARRON’S (Jan. 28, 2021, 1:28 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/why-u-s-workers-need-a-25per-hour-minimum-wage-51611858500 [https://perma.cc/GN5W-ZBNT].
405. See Robin Bleiweis, The Equal Rights Amendment: What You Need to Know, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2020, 4:05 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports
/2020/01/29/479917/equal-rights-amendment-need-know/ [https://perma.cc/M489-8GN2].
406. See Ken Coleman, Women Have Been Waiting Almost a Century for the ERA. Will It Finally Become
Law?, MICH. ADVANCE (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.michiganadvance.com/2021/04/19/women-havebeen-waiting-almost-a-century-for-the-era-will-it-finally-become-law/ [perma.cc/FLD8-UNYL].
407. See Alaina Lancaster, How Justice Amy Coney Barrett Is Already Changing the Supreme Court,
LAW.COM (May 14, 2021, 5:04 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2021/05/14/how-justice-amyconey-barrett-is-already-changing-the-supreme-court/?slreturn=20210510081610 [perma.cc/4NTE744F].
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written, as opposed to engaging in more holistic interpretation that
takes into account legislative aims, historical context, and policy
consequences. 408 Because Congress articulated two dates for the
adoption of the ERA as a constitutional amendment, and those dates
are long past, a majority of the Court will likely view that legislation as
dead. 409 The ERA, however, could be reintroduced in Congress at a later
date. This approach may stand a better chance, considering that
Democrats have a very slim majority in the Senate and consequently
control of the bills that are introduced. 410 Still, state ratification of an
entirely new ERA, if successful, would likely take years, making this
reform a remote possibility.
C. Specific Measures
Each proposed change discussed thus far requires congressional
action, and the close congressional party split will require careful
prioritizing of which actions to tackle first. In addition, Biden and
Congress must grapple with the lasting impacts of the Trump
administration and the pandemic. There are, however, many specific
measures that Biden’s administration can implement quickly to
effectuate his “fair chance” society, specifically with respect to women’s
equality in the workforce.
On his first day in office, President Biden signed fifteen executive
orders and took two executive actions. 411 He issued many more in
subsequent days, most of which undo some of the nearly 200 executive
orders issued by President Trump. 412 In issuing such orders, President
Trump, like President Obama before him, was often reacting to
Congress’s failure to pass legislation. 413 Throughout history, significant
actions, such as the first nondiscrimination order, were achieved
408. Strict constructionism contrasts with the philosophy of other justices such as Ruth Bader
Ginsburg who take the non-textualist view that courts should look at the purpose of the statute and
its policy consequences, placing more value on those considerations than on strict adherence to the
language. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1640 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
409. See generally Alex Cohen & Wilfred U. Codrington, The Equal Rights Amendment Explained,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/equal-rights-amendment-explained [perma.cc/QXJ4-5MJU].
410. The Senate is evenly split between Democrats and Republicans, but in tie votes, the Vice
President can cast the deciding vote. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
411. Alex Leary, Executive Orders Lay out Broad Agenda, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2021, at A1. Biden’s
predecessors signed no more than one. Id.
412. Jeff Green & Paige Smith, Biden’s Diversity Policies May Line up with Corporate America’s,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 19, 2020, at A11. President Obama issued 295 executive orders during his two
terms. Id.
413. See Dan Bosch, The Consequences of Over-Reliance on Executive Action, AM. ACTION F. (Mar. 1, 2021),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/the-consequences-of-over-reliance-on-executive-action/
[perma.cc/VVM9-SWA8].
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through executive orders, illustrating the importance of executive
orders as a tool in a closely divided Congress. 414
President Biden can also implement change through agencies and
federal contracts under his control. 415 For instance, federal contractors
can be more closely monitored to determine whether they actually
achieve diversity rather than just treating stated diversity goals as
required paperwork. 416 Another day-one Biden action was an order
directing federal agencies to deliver plans addressing the removal of
barriers to the advancement of minorities. 417 He also ordered the Office
of Management and Budget to more equitably allocate federal funds to
minority communities. 418 Importantly, Biden’s executive decisions were
enacted immediately, remedying issues more swiftly than could ever be
achieved via lengthy legislative changes aimed at growing gender
disparities.
The power of the purse is yet another way to swiftly achieve reform.
Federal contractors employ approximately a quarter of U.S. workers.419
Biden has already issued an order directing agencies to begin planning
for a $15 minimum wage for federal workers, and he is expected to issue
an order requiring federal contractors to pay a $15-per-hour minimum
wage in the near future. 420 The $15 pay would in turn put pressure on
private employers to meet that minimum if there is competition for
employees. Requiring contractors to meet diversity goals would also
help establish norms throughout the United States. A stated goal of the
new administration is to fight racism. 421 President Biden’s plan
targeting lower-income jobs—including hospitality, retail, food service,
and some health care jobs—disproportionately impacts women of color
where “total employment for Black women is 9.7% lower than it was in
February 2020” before the pandemic, with “Hispanic women close
behind at 8.6% lower,” and compared to 5.4% for white women.422
Additionally, women of color have been excluded by parts of the
#MeToo movement that have focused on white, affluent, educated
women instead of the “industries in which women of color workers are
414. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 28, 1965).
415. See 2021 Joseph R. Biden Jr. Executive Orders, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/
presidential-documents/executive-orders/joe-biden/2021 [perma.cc/25ZL-AG2M].
416. See Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, A Shift in Federal Government Priorities for Diversity, Equity,
and Inclusion, LAW.COM (Apr. 6, 2021, 12:45 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2021/04/06/ashift-in-federal-government-priorities-for-diversity-equity-and-inclusion/ [perma.cc/R7NE-QW8P].
417. Leary, supra note 411, at A4.
418. Id.
419. Green & Smith, supra note 412, at A13.
420. Kate Davidson, Biden Signs Orders on Workers, Benefits—Moves Direct Agencies to Speed Virus
Aid and Reverse Trump Moves on Hiring Protections, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2021, at A4.
421. See The Biden Plan to Build back Better by Advancing Racial Equity Across the American Economy,
JOEBIDEN.COM, https://joebiden.com/racial-economic-equity/ [perma.cc/QKG9-4UJJ].
422. Rattner & Franck, supra note 368.
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strongly represented [which] are also particular hotbeds of sexual
harassment and assault.” 423 Increasing diversity training could also
counteract workplace discrimination. The history of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act shows that many advances for women followed from rights
first granted on the basis of race. 424 For example, the Supreme Court
authorized affirmative action on the basis of race in 1978; it allowed it
for women in 1987. 425 Though many large employers had attempted to
improve diversity through training programs, former President Trump
issued an executive order on September 22, 2020, halting much of that
training. 426 A reversal of this order is expected to be one of President
Biden’s first employment moves while in office. 427
Biden could also swiftly work to address women’s equality by
banning nondisclosure agreements with respect to discrimination
claims and settlements in federal contracts. As discussed earlier, there
are still immense gaps in sexual harassment law. 428 The #MeToo and
similar movements, though undoubtedly important in their own right,
do not protect an individual’s job when that person comes forward.
About one-third of the states have decided that the freedom of contract
is subordinate to the need for transparency regarding harassment.429
Given that many states have already addressed this issue, such a ban
would not be surprising to many, nor be too far a shift from the
norm. 430 The Biden administration could create uniform language and
rules, giving businesses a clearer idea of their obligations regardless of
their state of operation.
Under the right leadership, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), could also swiftly fight for equality in the
workplace. The EEOC is a bipartisan federal agency with five
423. P.R. Lockhart, Women of Color in Low-Wage Jobs Are Being Overlooked in the #MeToo Moment, VOX
(Dec. 19, 2017, 4:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/12/19/16620918/sexual-harassment-lowwages-minority-women [perma.cc/2DQJ-F4BE].
424. See generally Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative
History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137 (1997)
(presenting overview of the history of the sex discrimination provisions in the Civil Rights Act).
425. Binder et al., supra note 340, at 305.
426. Many companies urged Trump to withdraw the order. Khadeeja Safdar & Lauren Weber,
Business Groups Urge Trump to Pull Back Diversity-Training Order, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2020, at A4.
427. See Jessica Guynn, President Joe Biden Rescinds Donald Trump Ban on Diversity Training About Systemic
Racism, USA TODAY (Jan. 26, 2021, 4:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2021/01/20/bidenexecutive-order-overturns-trump-diversity-training-ban/4236891001/ [perma.cc/Q2T6-NT9Q].
428. See Carrie Baker, Ten Legislative Changes Needed to Prevent and Redress Sexual Harassment in All
American Workplaces, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Feb. 1, 2019), https://scholars.org/contribution/tenlegislative-changes-needed-prevent-and-redress-sexual-harassment-all-american [perma.cc/QM7NVUAX].
429. See infra Appendix (listing state laws restricting various aspects of nondisclosure
agreements).
430. See Gerald Sauer, The Nondisclosure Agreement: Time to Revamp?, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 19,
2020, 4:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/the-nondisclosure-agreementtime-to-revamp [perma.cc/5V8B-TWCP].
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commissioners appointed by the President. 431 In January 2021, Biden
named a new chair and vice chair. 432 It is the Commission’s
responsibility to “provide[] leadership and guidance” on the federal
government’s equal employment opportunity program.433 In its rules,
regulations, and enforcement actions, the Commission has
considerable power in the employment arena by enforcing federal laws
that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or employee
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
disability. 434 At a minimum, a reconfigured EEOC could halt some
Republican attempts to undermine the Commission’s efforts to secure
equality in the workplace. For example, by delegating some of its
authority to the Departments of Justice and Labor, the EEOC could
prevent the dilution of the agency’s power across partisan lines. 435
A reconfigured EEOC could also push for change in the workplace
by promoting salary transparency 436—one of Biden’s stated goals during
his campaign. 437 Studies have shown that knowledge of pay in an
organization and region enables women to bargain more effectively and
helps narrow the wage gap between men and women. 438 Women made
progress toward equal pay before the pandemic, especially among
younger workers, but the gap widens as women move up the

431. What You Should Know: ABCs of EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Apr. 20,
2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/what-you-should-know-abcs-eeoc [perma.cc/CQ5BKUKZ].
432. Id. The EEOC has announced the appointment of Commissioner Charlotte A. Burrows as
Chair of the Commission and Commissioner Jocelyn Samuels as Vice Chair. Press Release, U.S. Equal
Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, President Appoints Charlotte A. Burrows EEOC Chair (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/president-appoints-charlotte-burrows-eeoc-chair [https://perma.cc/
AYF2-GAER].
433. Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/overview
[https://perma.cc/48MM-Y4AK].
434. What Laws Does EEOC Enforce?, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://
www.eeoc.gov/youth/what-laws-does-eeoc-enforce [https://perma.cc/FQT2-VFAA].
435. But see Anne Cullen, EEOC Approves New Pact with Agencies Along Party Lines, LAW360 (Nov. 2,
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1324982/eeoc-approves-new-pact-with-agencies-along-partylines [https://perma.cc/P3G4-XNQR]; but see also Mark Neuberger, Biden Puts Thumbprint on NLRB and
Begins to Unwind Trump Board Policies, JD SUPRA (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
biden-puts-thumbprint-on-nlrb-and-9615503/ [https://perma.cc/Q4LE-WXAF]. Neuberger explains
that Biden can also have a major impact on the National Labor Relations Board through appointment of
its general counsel. Neuberger, supra. The NLRB is led by a five-person board, and a Trump appointee’s
term expires in August 2021. Id. This gives Biden a chance to create a Democratic majority. Id.
436. See generally Jake Rosenfeld & Patrick Denice, The Power of Transparency: Evidence from a
British Workplace Survey, 80 AM. SOCIO. REV. 1045 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122415597019
[https://perma.cc/33PQ-QRH2] (arguing for the importance of financial transparency in
workplaces to aid workers in bargaining for wages).
437. Green & Smith, supra note 412.
438. See, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin, Cindy A. Schipani, Frances J. Milliken & Madeline K.
Kneeland, Assessing Progress of Women in Corporate America: The More Things Change, the More They Stay
the Same, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 750–54 (2018).
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organizational hierarchy. 439 One step toward transparency would be
prohibiting employers from banning employees’ discussion of salaries.
This prohibition should certainly apply to federal contractors given the
power of the presidency. At least a quarter of the states already have
such legislation, 440 thus this kind of rule should not prove too
controversial. Another change the EEOC could implement is publishing
salary ranges for classes of jobs in various regions. Moreover, the
government could require federal contractors to make salary
information publicly available. Increasing salary transparency among
both public and private employers would be a huge step forward for
women’s equality, as equality increases alongside transparency. 441
The EEOC could also more aggressively promote salary equity by
closing a loophole in the Equal Pay Act that essentially guts the
legislation. 442 The Act requires women be paid the same as men for
equal work in the same establishment. 443 However, an employer can
justify different pay simply by showing that the difference was based on
“any factor other than sex.” 444 Courts have interpreted this phrase
generously in favor of employers. 445 Many efforts have sought to correct
this loophole, with the proposed Paycheck Fairness Act (PFA) perhaps
having the potential to be the most effective. 446 This proposed
legislation would require the EEOC to “collect data on compensation,
hiring, termination, and promotion sorted by sex” and prevent
employers from retaliating against employees for disclosing and
discussing wage information. 447 By mandating the collection of hiring
and promotion data sorted by sex, the PFA may provide evidence of a
company trend of gender based discrimination and dispel arguments
that pay discrepancies were based on factors other than sex. Despite the

439. See, e.g., Lauren Weber, Younger Workers Report Biggest Gains in Happiness with Pay, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 29, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/younger-workers-report-biggest-gains-inhappiness-with-pay-11567071000 [https://perma.cc/CPE3-NLVL]; Grace Hauck, When Will Women Get
Equal Pay? Not for Another 257 Years, Report Says, USA TODAY (Dec. 22, 2019, 12:49 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/12/20/gender-pay-gap-equal-wages-expected-257-yearsreport/2699326001/ [https://perma.cc/4JUT-7ZKE] (reporting that in the World Economic Forum’s
annual survey, the United States ranked 53rd out of 153 countries in terms of pay equity).
440. Dworkin et al., supra note 438, at 761–62, app. B.
441. Stephen Miller, Transparency Shrinks Gender Pay Gap?, SOC. HUM. RES. MGMT. (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/compensation/pages/transparency-shrinks-genderpay-gap.aspx [https://perma.cc/69X7-N74S].
442. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. See Sabrina L. Brown, Negotiating Around the Equal Pay Act: Use of the “Factor Other than Sex”
Defense to Escape Liability, 78 OHIO STATE L.J. 471, 473 (2017).
446. See S.862 (114th): Paycheck Fairness Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills
/114/s862/summary [https://perma.cc/Y2F6-K4BP].
447. Id.

414

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:2

Act’s failure to be enacted by Congress over many years, 448 several states
have adopted most or parts of the PFA. 449 In this period of inflection,
enacting such an act may even be possible in Congress. 450
CONCLUSION
The inflection period of 2020–2021 has already caused significant
change. Democrats control both houses of Congress as well as the
Executive branch, and social movements including Black Lives Matter
and #MeToo have gained unprecedented traction. Although there is a
greater understanding of our societal inequities, there is still a pressing
need for women workers—especially women of color—to be supported
economically, by promoting reentry into the workforce and fair pay,
and to be equipped with stronger protections from workplace sexual
harassment. Many of these reforms stand on the shoulders of previous
movements, such as those preceding the passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment and 1964 Civil Rights Act, which also sought to address
inequality. The time is again ripe for change. It remains to be seen
whether the post-inflection period will result in the necessary reforms
for women in the workplace. Some potential changes, such as a
reinterpretation of the Equal Pay Act and a new ERA will require great
expenditures of political capital and unanimity of purpose. A unified
purpose provides opportunities and hope for significant reform during
a time of such uncertainty. The recent passage of federal legislation
banning forced arbitration for claims of sexual harassment and sexual
assault in employment contracts bolsters hope for future reform.
New York Times reporters Kantor and Twohey may have said it best
when, reflecting upon the #MeToo movement, they wrote: “Progress
requires a correct accounting of what women have really faced.” 451 The
legal changes motivated by the #MeToo movement will impact young,
female professionals the most. These individuals are navigating, for the
first time, the difficulties of being women in the workplace, as
survivors, and as individuals whose professional advancement has been
historically limited. Traditional legal avenues have thus far failed to
bridge the gender gap in the workplace. Nevertheless, one can hope

448. Catherine Lerum, Equal Pay for Women Can Become a Reality: A Proposal for Enactment of the
Paycheck Fairness Act, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 221, 223 (2013) (noting that the PFA was first considered in
1997).
449. Dworkin et al., supra note 438, at 759–60, app. A.
450. See Christina Pazzanese, Where Are We Now After a Second Impeachment?, HARV. GAZETTE
(Jan. 13, 2021), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/01/american-democracy-could-be-atinflection-point-say-experts/ [https://perma.cc/8E8H-JUAK].
451. Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1.
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that after the fall from grace of prominent businessmen and the rise of
the #MeToo movement that “the times, they are a-changin’.” 452

452. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a Changin,’ on THE TIMES THEY ARE A CHANGIN’ (Columbia
Records 1964).
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State

Does the state . . .
prohibit confidentiality
provisions?

provide any exceptions to such prohibit waiving one’s rights
explicitly prohibit
confidentiality prohibition?
or remedies generally?
mandatory arbitration?

Arizona

NDAs are not prohibited,
N/A
but claimants can violate
their terms to discuss sexual
misconduct with law
enforcement or respond to a
court’s request.
The bill defines an NDA as “a
confidentiality agreement or
contract provision that
prohibits the disclosure of
information by a party.”
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-720
(2020).

N/A

N/A

California

Generally:
Prohibited in settlements for
claims of:
(1) sexual assault,
(2) sexual harassment,
(3) workplace discrimination
based on sex,
(4) failure to prevent
harassment, and
(5) retaliation.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001
(West 2020).
**This prohibition applies
only to claims filed in civil or
administrative actions. It
does not apply to prelitigation settlements.**

The provision is allowed if:
(1) it is requested by the
claimant and (2) shields the
claimant’s identity. This
exception does not apply if a
government agency or agent is
a party to the agreement.

No contract or settlement
provision may waive a party’s
right to testify regarding
sexual harassment in a
proceeding by court request.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.11 (West
2020).

An agreement may require that
the settlement amount remain
confidential.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001
(West 2020).

Employers cannot prevent
employees from disclosing
“unlawful acts in the
workplace,” including sexual
harassment, in return for a
raise or bonus.
CAL. GOV’T CODE §
12964.5(a)(2) (West 2020).

The state legislature
attempted to enact AB
51, which would have
effectively banned
mandatory arbitration
clauses, but a federal
district court enjoined
the law’s enactment in
February 2020.
Chamber of Com. v.
Becerra, No. 19-cv02456, 438 F. Supp. 3d
1078 (E.D. Cal. 2020),
aff'd in part, vacated in
part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Chamber of Com. v.
Bonta, 13 F.4th 766 (9th
Cir. 2021); Assemb. B.
51, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2019).

For Employers:
Employers cannot force
employees to sign a nondisparagement agreement
or similar document which
gives up the employee’s right
to discuss unlawful acts in
the workplace, including
sexual harassment.
CAL. GOV’T CODE §
12964.5(a)(2) (West 2020).

Illinois

For Employers:
Cannot unilaterally include a
confidentiality provision in
any settlement or
termination agreement.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96/130(b) (2020).

Louisiana

For Public Agents:
No settlement agreement
with a public entity or agent
can include a confidentiality
provision if: (1) the claim is
based on sexual harassment
or assault and (2) public
funds were spent to reach
the agreement.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5109.1
(2020).

Maryland

N/A

Nevada

A settlement agreement
cannot contain a
confidentiality clause if the
claim relates to sexual
misconduct.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 10.195(1)
(2020).

A confidentiality provision is
allowed if:
(1) it is documented that the
employee wants it and the
provision benefits both parties;
(2) the employee is notified in
writing of their right to have an
attorney review the agreement;
(3) there is consideration in
exchange for confidentiality;
(4) the confidentiality provision
covers only events that have
already occurred;
(5) the employee has 21 days to
consider the agreement; and
(6) the employee has 7 days to
revoke the agreement after it
has been signed.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96/1-30(a)
(2020).

Voids any clause that, as a
condition of employment,
requires employees to waive
substantive or procedural
rights related to “unlawful
employment practice[s].”
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96/125(b) (2020).
EXCEPTION: such clause is
allowed if:
(1) it is in writing,
(2) both parties provide
bargained-for
consideration, and
(3) the employee can still
report “good faith” allegations
to government officials and
seek legal advice.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96/1-25(c)
(2020).

Voids any clause that, as
a condition of
employment, requires
employees to arbitrate
claims of “unlawful
employment
practice[s].”
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96
/1-25(b) (2020).
EXCEPTION: the clause
is allowed if:
(1) it is in writing,
(2) both parties provide
bargained-for
consideration, and
(3) the employee can still
report “good faith”
allegations to
government officials
and seek legal advice.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 96
/1-25(c) (2020).

Settlement agreements not
involving a public entity or
agent, or where public funds
are not used.
See LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5109.1
(2020).

N/A

N/A

N/A

For Employers:
Voids provisions waiving
substantive or procedural
rights or remedies regarding a
sexual harassment claim.
If an employer attempts to
enforce such a provision, they
are liable for the employee’s
attorney’s fees.
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.
§ 3-715(a) (West 2020).

The provision voiding
waiver of rights or
remedies also voids
mandatory arbitration
of sexual harassment
claims.
See MD. CODE ANN., LAB.
& EMPL. § 3-715(a) (West
2020).

If the claimant requests it, the
settlement must keep
confidential: (1) the claimant’s
identity and (2) any facts that
could disclose the claimant’s
identity. This exception does
not apply if a public agent is a
party to the agreement.
The settlement amount may
remain confidential in any
case.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 10.195(4)–(6)
(2020).

N/A

N/A

New Jersey

N/A
For Employers:
Confidentiality prohibited in
settlements or contracts
with a current or former
employee if it relates to: (1)
discrimination,
(2) retaliation, or (3)
harassment.
Any settlement agreement
resolving one of the three
types of claims listed above
must include a notice that
even if the parties agree to
keep the facts confidential,
the clause “is unenforceable
against the employer if the
employee publicly reveals
sufficient details of the claim
so that the employer is
reasonably identifiable.”

For Employers:
Prohibits clauses that waive
“any substantive or
procedural right or remedy
relating to a claim of
discrimination, retaliation, or
harassment.” This does not
apply to collective bargaining
agreements.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.7
(West 2020).

The provision
prohibiting a waiver of
rights or remedies could
be interpreted to also
prohibit mandatory
arbitration clauses. This
has yet to be litigated.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10:5-12.7 (West 2020).

Employers who attempt to
enforce a prohibited
confidentiality provision are
liable for the employee’s
litigation costs.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.8,
12.9 (West 2020).

New Mexico

For Employers:
Private employers cannot, as
a term of employment,
require employees to sign
confidentiality provisions in
settlements of sexual
harassment claims.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-36
(2020).

Settlement agreements with an N/A
employee may include a
confidentiality provision if it:
(1) applies to the settlement’s
monetary terms,
(2) protects the employee’s
identity (if the employee
requests this), or
(3) is at the employee’s request
and still allows information to
be disclosed when legally
required.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-36(B)–
(C) (2020).

N/A

New York

For Employers:
Prohibited in settlements or
other means of resolving
discrimination claims
outside of litigation.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5003-B
(CONSOL. 2020).

The confidentiality provision is
allowed if the claimant:
(1) prefers confidentiality,
(2) has 21 days to consider the
agreement, and
(3) has 7 days to revoke the
agreement after it has been
signed.
Parties may agree to keep the
settlement amount
confidential.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5003-B (CONSOL.
2020).

Oregon

For Employers:
Prohibited from using
confidentiality provisions
with employees that cover
claims of sexual
discrimination or assault.
OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.370(1)
(2020).

Employers may enter into a
“settlement, separation or
severance agreement” that
includes a confidentiality
provision if the employee
requests it and has seven days
following the agreement to
revoke it.

A proposed bill, would void
contractual provisions that:
(1) waive procedural rights
and remedies or
(2) conceal details (other than
a monetary term) related to
sexual discrimination,
retaliation, or harassment
claims.
S.B. S6382A, 2017 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2017).

Mandatory arbitration
clauses for
discrimination claims
are prohibited if an
employer has four or
more employees.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515
(CONSOL. 2020).
In 2019, however, a
federal court ruled that
New York’s ban on
mandatory arbitration is
preempted under the
Federal Arbitration Act.
Latif v. Morgan Stanley
& Co., No. 18-cv-11528,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107020 (S.D.N.Y. June
26, 2019).

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

If the employer “makes a good
faith determination” that an
employee engaged in
discrimination or sexual
assault, the employer can
include a confidentiality clause
in a settlement, separation, or
severance agreement with that
employee.
OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.370(2)–
(4) (2020).
Tennessee

For Local Education
Agencies:
Public school districts and
other educational agencies
cannot enter into or require
an NDA in any
settlement of a sexual
misconduct claim.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-2-131
(2020).
For Employers:
An employer cannot impose
a term of employment
requiring an employee to
sign an NDA regarding
sexual harassment.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-108
(2020).

N/A

Vermont

For Employers:
Prohibited from requiring
someone, as a term of
employment, to sign a
contract that prevents them
from reporting, disclosing,
or participating in an
investigation of sexual
harassment.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
495h(g) (2020).

N/A

An employer cannot, as a term
of employment, require
someone to waive substantive
or procedural rights or
remedies regarding sexual
harassment claims.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
495h(g) (2020).

The provision
prohibiting the waiver of
rights or remedies
would prohibit
mandatory arbitration
agreements as a
condition of
employment.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 495h(g) (2020).

N/A

N/A

Any sexual harassment
settlement must state that it
does not prohibit the
claimant from:
(1) bringing a sexual
harassment complaint to a
state or federal agency (such
as the Attorney General’s
Office or the EEOC);
(2) testifying or assisting
with a sexual harassment
investigation conducted by a
state or federal agency; or
(3) complying with a
discovery request in civil
litigation, or testifying at a
trial for a sexual harassment
claim in court or at
arbitration proceedings.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
495h(h)(2) (2020).
Virginia

For Employers:
May not require employees
to sign an employment
contract agreeing to keep
details relating to a sexual
assault claim confidential.
VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.01
(2020).

N/A

Washington

For Employers:
Prohibited from forcing
employees to sign a
preemptive document
containing a confidentiality
provision regarding sexual
assault or harassment in the
workplace.
WASH. REV. CODE §
49.44.210(1) (2020).

A settlement agreement can
N/A
include a confidentiality
provision if the provision was
written after actual litigation
began or was threatened.
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.210(4)
(2020).

A provision requiring an
employee to waive their
right to “publicly pursue
a cause of action” for
discrimination is
unenforceable.
WASH. REV. CODE §
49.44.085 (2020).

